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Chinese Nationalism and the “Gray Zone”
Case Analyses of Public Opinion and PRC Maritime Policy
Introduction: Assessing Public Opinion’s Impact on PRC Foreign Policy

T

his volume examines the role of popular nationalism in China’s maritime conduct. Analysis of nine case studies of assertive but ostensibly nonmilitary actions
by which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has advanced its position in the South
and East China Seas in recent years reveals little compelling evidence of popular sentiment driving decision-making. While some regard for public opinion demonstrably
shapes Beijing’s propaganda strategies on maritime issues, and sometimes its diplomatic
practices as well, the imperative for Chinese leaders to satisfy popular nationalism is at
most a contributing factor to policy choices they undertake largely on the basis of other
considerations of power and interest. Where surges of popular nationalism have been
evident, they have tended to follow after the PRC maritime actions in question, suggesting instead that Chinese authorities channeled public opinion to support existing policy.
Each case study represents a typical instance of the PRC’s increased maritime activities
in the “gray zone” of coercion below the threshold of overt military confrontation. In
most cases, popular nationalism was demonstrably not a significant factor behind the
party-state’s assertive on-water behavior.1 Of the nine cases considered, in only three did
popular influence plausibly play a role: in the Sino-Indonesian fishery disputes of 2010
to 2016 (case study 3), in the Scarborough Shoal incident of 2012 (case study 6), and in
the controversy over Japan’s 2012 “nationalization” of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (case
study 7).2 Yet even in these more likely cases, it is still not clear that the party-state would
have acted differently in the absence of popular nationalism.
Indeed, each case shows sufficient cause for Beijing’s actions in some combination of (1)
China’s increasing maritime administrative capabilities, (2) increased material value of
the disputed maritime possessions, (3) the changing legal regime in which China seeks
to enforce its claims, (4) perceived challenges to the viability of China’s claims, and (5) a
host of domestic elite political considerations besides popular nationalism. After examining the role of each of these factors in the cases, the monograph concludes with some
policy recommendations.

2

china maritime studies

Does Popular Nationalism Drive China’s Assertiveness?
Speculation about popular nationalism’s influence on Chinese foreign policy can be
found across academic works, government reports, think tank briefs, media commentary, and state officials’ remarks. For several decades now, the PRC party-state
has worked to cultivate among Chinese citizens a sentimental attachment to far-flung
disputed islands, rocks, reefs, energy resources, and maritime spaces in the South and
East China Seas. This conspicuous buildup of the symbolic political significance of these
remote possessions is readily visible in children’s textbooks; everyday news; propaganda
directives; books and academic research; events; social media campaigns; and, perhaps
most infamously, the nine-dash line in the South China Sea.3 Given the apparent alignment among these efforts to build what Chinese propaganda strategists call 海洋意识
(maritime consciousness) and the PRC’s more confrontational pursuit of its claims at
sea, the speculation is hardly surprising.
The nationalism explanation has featured prominently in analyses seeking to explain
supposedly suboptimal, unstrategic, or counterproductive aspects of China’s behavior
on its maritime littoral that have resulted in setbacks to the PRC’s relations with many
of its neighbors. “The most likely—and worrisome—explanation,” former White House
adviser Ely Ratner has argued, “is that domestic priorities drive China’s foreign policies.”4
Thomas J. Christensen has explained a range of belligerent PRC posturing as arising from a combination of overconfidence in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and
oversensitivity to nationalist criticism.5 Rory M. Medcalf and Raoul Heinrichs similarly
suggest “some assertive Chinese maritime behavior may be intended as a demonstration
of naval capacity to Chinese audiences.”6
The possibility that rising popular nationalism lies behind Beijing’s assertive maritime
policy carries three important real-world implications. The first concerns the prospects
for outside actors to influence China’s actions. Singaporean prime minister Lee Hsien
Loong notes that “astonishing progress has roused strong nationalistic feelings and a desire to claim China’s rightful place in the sun, after more than a century of humiliation.”7
If such sentiments drive China’s actions at sea, as Lee suggests, any attempts at deterring
them likely would prove counterproductive. By contrast, if the PRC’s maritime-dispute
policy reflects careful calculations of the international situation by the top leadership
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), there may be more scope for outside actors to
shape Beijing’s conduct, using incentives and disincentives.
Second is the possibility that popular nationalist influence on policy could render crises
or incidents at sea uncontrollable. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work noted at
a 2014 gathering in Washington, DC, that “[i]n the Asia-Pacific, nationalism is fueling
and exacerbating territorial disputes and maritime claims, leading to increased tensions
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and greater chances of miscalculations among the countries in the region.”8 Such miscalculations, in turn, could escalate into disastrous conflict as a result of domestic nationalist demands. Back in 2012, Singaporean foreign minister K. Shanmugam warned that in
the South China Sea “there is a risk that decisions could be influenced or even dominated by domestic public opinion.” The risk of this occurring “should not be underestimated,” Shanmugam continued, “and the consequences if those risks come about cannot
be underestimated either.”9
Third is the ability of the PRC to enlist popular nationalism as a foreign policy resource.
The U.S. Defense Department’s annual report to Congress has noted that “nationalistic
appeals for a more muscular PRC posture, particularly during times of crisis, effectively
constrain more moderate, pragmatic elites in China’s foreign policy establishment,” but
that popular nationalism also could offer the regime a negotiating resource.10 A widely
cited report from the International Crisis Group similarly describes nationalism as
“both useful to Beijing in the South China Sea and a constraint that limits its options.”11
If popular nationalism has been an instrument of China’s foreign policy, then Beijing’s
management of public opinion—usually recognized as an internal matter—in fact lies
within the scope of state-to-state diplomacy. If so, then China, the United States, and
other regional states need to discuss the management of domestic public opinion, both
informally and formally in diplomatic settings, in much greater depth.
Despite these important, real-world implications, the proposition that rising popular
nationalism lies behind Beijing’s assertive conduct in maritime East Asia has not been
tested systematically—a problem that relates to the near-total opacity of the CCP’s
decision-making processes. This volume attempts to tackle this challenge by tracing the
interactions between Chinese domestic discourse and party-state policy in nine carefully
chosen cases of Beijing’s assertive activity in the South and East China Seas.
Defining the Key Concepts
Before addressing the cases, we must define key terms around which this volume’s analysis revolves. The first of these is popular nationalism, or nationalist public opinion. In
common usage, nationalism can refer to an unwieldy array of social phenomena, ranging
from nonliberal trade policies or the passion of sports fans for their country’s representative team, through anticolonial resistance or racist, far-right movements, to hard-line
foreign policy preferences. The voluminous scholarship on nationalism has not produced an agreed-upon definition.12 This study therefore uses a working definition whose
scope encompasses the phenomenon of interest: public actions or sentiments favoring
more-assertive foreign policy actions.
This definition is designed to direct the focus toward those social phenomena that are
both observable and capable of generating bottom-up pressure for confrontational
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gray-zone actions on foreign policy issues. However, it also is broad enough to cover
both nationalist mobilizations, such as street protests, boycotts, and petitions, and
mediated manifestations of nationalism, such as online commentary, consumption of
jingoistic media content, and opinion survey results. The word popular denotes that the
sentiments or actions are shared among a large number of citizens, but this does not imply participation by or the agreement of a majority, or even a significant minority, of the
population. The term popular nationalism will be used interchangeably with nationalist
public opinion, and in distinction from elite nationalism.13
Popular nationalism could influence a wide variety of state decisions, policies, and actions; however, this volume is concerned solely with its implications for foreign policy,
that is, 对外政策 (policy toward the outside). The Chinese construction helpfully
reminds us to consider whether a given action actually is directed toward the outside
world, thereby foregrounding the distinction between foreign policy and state behavior.14 China’s party-state comprises a sprawling complex of agencies, organizations, and
informal groupings, sometimes with competing bureaucratic, financial, and political
interests. It therefore is vital to consider whether a given action that a frontline agency
takes accurately reflects the central party leadership’s intentions. One-off actions, taken
by uncoordinated frontline or substate agencies, that cease after coming to the attention
of the leadership can be considered state behavior, but do not necessarily represent the
state’s foreign policy.15 The role of nonstate actors in the disputed seas, too, must be considered carefully. Tacit or explicit state authorization of nonstate actors to take actions
that clearly impinge on outside interests is a foreign policy action under the definition
used here. But where official connections with nonstate actions are lacking, only the
state’s subsequent responses can be interpreted safely as policy. In sum, to the extent that
we reasonably can conclude that central party-state decision makers were aware that a
given course of action would bear on foreign governments, it will fit the definition of
foreign policy.16
Finally, the precise meaning of the term gray zone has generated debate among scholars,
but it is deployed here to denote confrontational or assertive actions designed to remain below the threshold of military conflict.17 Gray-zone actions are acts of coercion
in physical space—that is, they exclude diplomatic moves, propaganda, and verbal
representations.18
Alternative Explanations for PRC Maritime Assertiveness
Nationalist public opinion is only one of many plausible drivers of China’s maritime actions, so to understand its possible impact it is necessary to assess the strength of other
factors as well. The stronger these alternative explanations are, the less likely it is that
popular nationalism played a decisive role in such actions. Decades of research on public
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opinion and foreign policy in democracies indicate that any bottom-up public influence,
such as that of popular nationalism, is limited, especially where the issue in question is
remote from people’s everyday lives.19 If this is true in democracies, then it is even more
likely to be the case in the PRC, where the ruling party is not directly accountable to
the public through regular elections. As a baseline, then, we should demand substantial
evidence that policy makers were responsive to popular nationalism before we conclude
that it was a viable explanation for observed actions.
We also need evidence that nationalist public opinion did not simply affirm choices
toward which leaders were inclined already. It will be insufficient merely to observe that
China’s actions accorded with, or won approval from, public opinion. Establishing a
bottom-up nationalist effect on foreign policy requires at least some basis for believing
that the decision makers’ own policy preferences were less hard-line than the public’s.
Thus, the strength of alternative explanations will be crucial to our assessment of public
opinion’s strength as an explanatory factor; if other common calculations of the leaders
easily explain a foreign policy action, there will be little reason to think they would have
acted differently if public opinion had been less nationalistic.
Alternative explanations are especially important to consider when discussing the possibility of public opinion as a constraint on the party-state’s actions. There may well be a
range of courses of action that are closed off because they would be prohibitively costly
to the party’s legitimacy with the public. Permitting Taiwan to declare independence
is perceived widely as an example of this; others might include dropping the claims to
the Spratly or Diaoyu Islands entirely, or officially renouncing the nine-dash-line map.
Again, however, saying that the public has influenced the state’s policy requires establishing a basis for believing that the leadership might have acted differently, or at least that
some actors with influence over policy may have wanted to take the course of action that
popular nationalism precluded. In short, identifying any role for popular nationalism as
a contributory factor behind policy outcomes will require careful consideration of what
else might explain the action in question.
In explaining Chinese maritime policy, a distinction needs to be drawn between underlying long-term drivers and variables that may explain change. The underlying drivers
of a state’s policy in maritime disputes include its self-defined security, economic, and
political interests in the disputed possessions in question. In the case of China, these
often are much greater than outside analysts appreciate. For example, while it has been
common in English-language discourse on the South China Sea to find the military
significance of the Spratly Islands dismissed as insignificant, Chinese party-state materials generally have posited a link between control of the islands and control of the surrounding maritime space, which most observers would agree is strategically vital. The
PRC’s construction of facilities on the seven Spratly reefs it occupies, most recently with
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massive land-reclamation works, deepwater ports, and large airfields, reflects Beijing’s
long-standing belief in the military applications of the islands.20 Similarly, since the
1970s PRC estimates of potential offshore resource bounties have been orders of magnitude higher than those from sources elsewhere.21
The CCP’s symbolic political stake in its maritime disputes also is not new; the discourse
of righteous historical victimization has been a feature of PRC policy discussion on the
South China Sea since the 1980s, or even earlier.22 These large, long-standing stakes in
the dispute make it necessary to consider rigorously whether a given maritime action is
understood better as a continuation of the PRC’s ongoing pursuit of these interests or as
a policy change requiring explanation by reference to other variables.
Explaining changes in China’s policy or behavior at sea will require identifying variation
in the factors capable of animating it. One enabling factor for gray-zone activities is the
material balance of power in the region, considering the PRC’s military and economic
capabilities relative to those of other actors in its region. As will be seen, the regional
balance of power has been shifting steadily in China’s favor across the period of China’s
assertiveness. If gray-zone actions are designed to advance the state’s interests without
triggering open conflict, then greater ability to impose military and economic costs in
a conflict scenario should make the state’s opponents less inclined to challenge such actions, thereby increasing the scope for them.
In many cases, however, Beijing already enjoyed a preponderance of material capabilities over its adversaries, particularly in the South China Sea, before its patterns of action
changed. In such cases, the changing balance of power could have made a difference only insofar as China’s calculations involved the possibility of U.S. intervention.
America’s preoccupation with its Middle East wars likely raised China’s estimation of
the threshold for U.S. intervention from 2001 onward, thus enabling a wider range and
greater intensity of Chinese actions in maritime East Asia. The global financial crisis
may have done the same starting from late 2008. But these changes in the balance of
power were at most an enabling condition for the PRC’s gray-zone policy that began in
2006–2007, rather than a trigger.
Explanations for increases in gray-zone activities can be grouped into five broad types.
These explanations are by no means mutually exclusive; it is common for analysts to
point to some combination of these factors when explaining changes in Chinese maritime policy.
1.

Maritime administrative capability: Greater quality and quantity of PRC maritime
administrative assets (including on-water law-enforcement units, logistical support,
energy-exploration equipment, and surveillance and communication capabilities)
enable Beijing to intensify its activities in disputed maritime spaces.
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2.

Material value of disputed possessions: Increases in the underlying value of the resources on China’s disputed maritime periphery increase the incentives for assertive
actions to secure them.23

3.

Legal regime: The progressive development of the controlling international legal
regime—the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)—has
hardened disputed maritime claims on all sides, spurred the development of new
enforcement capabilities, and created incentives for assertive actions to advance or
protect legal claims.24

4.

Weakening bargaining position: Where China’s position in a dispute is weak and
deteriorates further, leaders may perceive the likelihood of their resolving the
dispute in China’s favor to be in danger of declining to zero, creating incentives for
escalation to preserve the claim’s basic viability.25

5.

Substate political competition: Decision-making and foreign policy actions often
are a product of internal debate, political competition, and organizational pathologies. Assertive policies may result from political factions jockeying for authority,
vested interests lobbying for favors and preferred policies, bureaucratic and party
agencies seeking organizational prestige or access, agencies operating in disputed
areas stretching their mandates, or individual leaders exercising their personal
preferences.26

Three Models of Nationalism’s Role
There is no direct, institutional mechanism by which popular sentiments could influence the foreign policy decisions of an authoritarian leadership that does not stand for
popular elections. But China scholars have identified three kinds of processes through
which nationalist public opinion may influence PRC foreign policy. The first involves
the legitimacy concerns of the party-state. The second centers on elite contention opening the door to bottom-up influence. The third model holds that the state can make
use of the Chinese public’s nationalist sentiments as a strategic resource in PRC foreign
policy.
Legitimacy Model. The most straightforward models of domestic public opinion as a
factor in Chinese foreign policy hold that leaders take confrontational actions to bolster
or preserve their legitimacy with the public. A common starting point is the notion that
Beijing’s abandonment of revolutionary egalitarian communism in favor of marketoriented economic reform since the 1980s has created an ideological vacuum, and thus
a legitimacy deficit. Thomas Christensen puts it succinctly: “Since the CCP is no longer
communist, it must be even more Chinese.”27 Susan Shirk has argued that unwillingness to be criticized on nationalist grounds often prevents pragmatic Chinese policies
toward Japan, including over maritime issues in the East China Sea.28 Robert Ross has
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characterized the PRC’s maritime assertiveness as a subrational response to widespread
popular demand for “traditional symbols of great power status.”29
For this legitimacy model to be analytically plausible in a given case, the assertive actions in question must be publicized domestically, and the state must claim credit for its
actions—if not in its official version of events, then at least via mass media coverage.30 If
this does not occur, then a desire to boost legitimacy or mollify popular nationalist criticism cannot have been a major factor in the decision to engage in the assertive actions
in question. If the intention is to divert public attention away from domestic problems
(such as deteriorating economic conditions or political scandals), such issues should be
overshadowed by the assertive foreign policy actions. While no “smoking gun,” such an
observation would increase analytic confidence in the idea that rallying domestic support was among the state’s considerations.
Alternatively, we may look for rising public attention and mobilization levels toward the
issue in question. As a general rule, the higher the level of public attention on a foreign policy issue, the more likely it is to become a factor in a state’s decision-making.31
If we can find evidence of nationalist mobilization or unusually high public attention
on the issue prior to the state’s confrontational foreign policy actions, this will increase
the likelihood that those actions were chosen with at least an eye toward appeasing or
impressing public opinion. While Chinese public opinion is notoriously inaccessible
and subject to political distortions, the mass rollout of the Internet era has generated
new opportunities to gauge the online public’s reactions to news events retrospectively.
The Baidu Search Index (BSI), a database of continuous daily measurements of Internet
search activity on keywords from July 2006 onward, provides insight into the timing of
surges in public attention levels toward a given topic.32 This can be deployed in conjunction with online news searches, which can offer an indicative sample of the stories that
were circulating in China’s online mediascape before, during, and after observed attention spikes.33
Elite-Contention Model. More-specified models of nationalism’s role hold that elite
contention is what opens the door to popular influence on foreign policy. In an early
exposition of this idea, Joseph Fewsmith and Stanley Rosen argued that public opinion
was most likely to have an impact “when joined with the concerns or interests of those
higher in the system.”34 Substate actors or factions may seek to align themselves with
nationalist opinion, either to attack their political rivals or to promote hard-line policy
preferences based on ideological proclivities or narrow bureaucratic interests. Linda
Jakobson reports that a nationalistic political atmosphere has contributed to Beijing’s
assertive behavior in the South China Sea by providing political cover for maritimesecurity agencies to push the boundaries of their mandates.35 James Reilly has developed the implications of elite contention a step further, arguing that intrastate divisions
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may reduce the state’s ability to curtail spontaneous nationalist mobilizations, which in
turn can influence policy. Once a “wave of mobilization” swells in society, it not only
strengthens the position of hard-liners in any internal debates but also creates incentives
for other decision makers to adopt tougher stances to avoid damaging criticism.36
If this type of elite-contention process involving public opinion has been present in a
given case, we ought to find the hard-line actions coinciding with known periods of
elevated contention in elite politics, such as the CCP’s quinquennial congresses or acute
political crises.37 Of course, it is often difficult to know precisely when periods of leadership contention begin and end in China, so the predictions of contention-based models
regarding the timing of assertive policy shifts are not very specific.38 But if this basic
condition is met, we can seek further evidence by studying central media coverage for
inconsistencies that would hint at elite differences over the issue at hand or linkages between the issue and internal political struggles. If nationalist public opinion has become
important in intraparty struggles, we even may find particular elites or their proxies
explicitly justifying hard-line policy proposals as reflecting the will of the people.
Sequence is a central consideration to this analysis. If the assertive policy change follows
a wave of mobilization that arises during a period of high-level tensions, this is consistent with Reilly’s model of bottom-up influence on a divided elite. But if the sequence is
reversed, this suggests a third possibility besides those described by the legitimacy and
elite-contention models: that the state may have directed public opinion toward the issue
for strategic purposes.
Instrumental Model. “Two-level game” approaches to international relations have
drawn attention to the advantages that domestic constraints can provide to states at the
international negotiating table.39 One such line of research, examining the concept of
“audience costs,” suggests that domestic public opinion can serve strategic purposes,
even for authoritarian regimes such as the PRC.40 Jessica Chen Weiss has shown, for
example, that since in China antiforeign protests require permission from authorities but
are increasingly costly to suppress as they grow larger, their appearance or nonappearance helps to demonstrate the state’s willingness either to stand firm or to de-escalate
during an international crisis.41 Other research suggests that, in the Internet era, China
may be capable of conveying deterrent threats via nationalist public opinion without
running the risks associated with permitting antiforeign street protests. Even a stateguided, online-only wave of nationalist buzz, such as that seen in the aftermath of the
2016 South China Sea arbitration ruling, can sharpen outside observers’ perceptions of
the dangers of confronting Beijing at sea.42
If the state has instrumentalized popular nationalist sentiments as a resource in an
international dispute, we should be able to make three observations. First, surges in
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public attention or nationalist agitation should appear after the assertive policy shift in
question, not before. This can be tested by comparing the timing of an assertive policy
change with increases in popular mobilization or sentiments calling for tougher policy.
Besides the Baidu Search Index and News Archive described above, other accessible
indicators of popular nationalist activity include public online commentary, commercial
media sensationalism, and real-world mobilizations. If such indicators show that the rise
in nationalist sentiment occurred before the assertive shift in policy was decided on, this
will render the instrumental model unlikely as an explanation for the case at hand.
Second, official comments on the issue and state media coverage should be both widespread and consistent rather than concentrated in particular sectors or agencies. If the
state is seeking to channel nationalist public opinion strategically toward an issue, popular sentiments should be fueled by heightened official rhetoric and central state media
coverage, rather than by sections of the media that may have been acting on behalf of
substate interests. If a wave of nationalist outrage follows hardening diplomatic rhetoric
and intensified coverage of the issue across key state media, we can be confident that the
state’s foreign policy makers and propaganda authorities were aware of such coverage
and did not intervene. This will suggest, at a minimum, that the central leadership did
not consider the public’s expressions of patriotic sentiments inconvenient.
Third, we should observe the party-state attempting to draw foreign attention to those
nationalist sentiments. If diplomatic messaging or foreign-directed propaganda content
does not refer to public opinion, it is less likely that the state was attempting to use it
as a foreign policy resource. It is important to note, however, that this observation also
will be consistent with the bottom-up legitimacy and elite-contention models; we would
expect such remarks from a state feeling genuinely besieged by domestic nationalist
sentiments or from officials whose cooperative intentions had been frustrated by public
opinion.
The observations outlined above will not prove decisively which of the three models
applies. However, they will enable us to make informed judgments of which model fits
best, on the basis of how the different pieces of evidence fit together and the nature of
the state’s goals at the time.43
Using this analytic framework, the remainder of this volume assesses the impact of
popular nationalism in specific key cases of China’s gray-zone maritime behavior. Part
1 covers early alterations in China’s maritime-dispute behavior in 2006–2008, a period
when public attention toward maritime disputes was generally low. Part 2 details eight
contentious cases that occurred later and required that the party manage domestic
nationalist sentiments. The cases traced were chosen carefully to be typical of the PRC’s
ostensibly nonmilitary gray-zone maritime policy that has emerged since 2006.44
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After establishing the events in question as representative of the changes observed in the
PRC’s gray-zone maritime-dispute behavior over this period, each case study examines
domestic Chinese discourse for signs that could support or disconfirm the influence of
nationalist public opinion on the state’s conduct, before considering the strength of other
international and domestic explanations for China’s actions. As we will see, there is little
evidence of popular influence on the state’s on-water conduct; the state’s instrumental
channeling of citizens’ sentiments to support its foreign policy emerges as the most
prominent role for popular nationalism in China’s policy in maritime disputes.

2006–2008: Regularizing Maritime Rights Defense
Case Study 1. White Hulls and “Special Operations”
The steadily increasing presence of large patrol boats and their more frequent use for
coercive purposes are fundamental components of China’s gray-zone operations in the
South and East China Seas. Although these patterns of behavior have received increasing
attention in recent years, especially since the Impeccable incident of 2009 (see case study
2), they first began to intensify rapidly in 2006–2007.45
Case study 1 details three early alterations in China’s maritime-dispute behavior during
this period: (1) the rollout of a system of regular rights-defense patrols from mid-2006;
(2) the Triton 626 incident, involving intense Sino-Vietnamese clashes over PRC oil
exploration in mid-2007; and (3) operations to interfere with Vietnam’s continental
shelf surveys. Together these three alterations constitute an amalgamated case study. In
contrast to the other case studies examined later, the gray-zone policies covered herein
emerged during a period when public attention toward maritime disputes remained relatively low, allowing Beijing to act with much less public scrutiny than it would face from
2009 onward.
Components of the Case Study
The Commencement of Regular Rights-Defense Patrols. A new program of 定期维权巡
航 (regular rights-defense patrols) commenced in July 2006 in the East China Sea. The
program centers on maintaining a minimum presence of white-hulled (i.e., civilian)
patrol vessels and daily surveillance flights in areas subject to PRC jurisdictional claim.
In February 2007, the agency responsible for these patrols, China Marine Surveillance
(CMS), under the PRC State Oceanic Administration (SOA), extended the regular patrol
area into the Yellow Sea and the northern part of the South China Sea, and again nine
months later to include the southern part of the South China Sea. Thus, by December
2007, the regular rights-defense patrol system covered all of “the 3 million square kilometers of waters under China’s administration”—the extent of China’s claimed (but, in
2006, largely unrealized) jurisdiction in the East and South China Seas.46
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The rollout of the PRC’s constabulary presence in disputed waters was accompanied by a
new willingness to deploy these white-hulled ships for coercive purposes. In mid-2006, a
fleet of small, armed, maritime law-enforcement vessels from the China Maritime Police,
under the People’s Armed Police, escorted a seismic survey ship from China’s stateowned oil company CNPC into waters south of the Paracel Islands. Ryan Martinson has
detailed how this fleet of twelve armed ships protected the survey from large numbers of
Vietnamese vessels that attempted to disrupt the two-month operation.47
Subsequently, however, responsibility for protecting unilateral PRC energy surveys in
disputed waters was transferred to the unarmed CMS fleet that also had been tasked
with conducting the regular rights-defense patrols. These developments marked the
arrival of China’s “gray-zone” strategy, combining coercion and unilateral administration
of disputed maritime spaces with active avoidance of escalation to military conflict.
The Triton 626 Incident. CNPC’s energy-survey operations moved to an even more provocative location in 2007, precipitating serious clashes known as the Triton 626 incident.
The operation was scheduled to take place in an area referred to as the “626 Work Area,”
approximately forty-seven nautical miles (nm) west of Triton Island, the westernmost
land feature of the Paracels, and therefore the closest to the Vietnamese coast.48
Vietnamese vessels initially turned back the Chinese survey ship and positioned
themselves at this location, preventing the survey from proceeding.49 In response, the
SOA sent patrol boats from the CMS East Sea and South Sea regional branches to act
as escorts for the survey ship. On June 29, the two cutters arrived in the area, but the
Vietnamese ships refused to leave; a standoff ensued that lasted into the following
day. According to a Chinese state media account, the Vietnamese ships’ presence was
preventing the survey ship from lowering its seismic cables, so “the Chinese maritime
commander decisively issued the order to ram the other side’s vessels.” This ramming
action was performed repeatedly until all the Vietnamese vessels were forced to leave
(figure 1).50
The Triton 626 incident was a milestone for the CMS force, and may have been the first
time the newly equipped agency had gone beyond surveillance or shadowing operations to engage in a genuinely coercive enforcement action. Comments of CMS officials
interviewed in a China Central Television (CCTV) documentary indicate that this was
the first time the CMS South Sea Regional Fleet had been used in this way.51 Another
suggestion of the significance of the operation is the special awards ceremony for the
“South China Sea Special Rights Defense Law Enforcement Operation,” held in Beijing
on 26 September 2007, to commend participants and hear reports on the incident.52
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Figure 1. The Triton 626 incident. Left, approximate location of the confrontations; right, onscene footage of deliberate ramming of Vietnamese ship, filmed from CMS ship (“Defenders
of the Blue Domain”).

Interference with Vietnamese Surveys. A series of similar “special operations” performed
by CMS followed. Targets included scientific vessels collecting geological data for
Vietnam’s submission to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and
Vietnamese and Philippine oil and gas surveys within the nine-dash line.53
Analysis of the Case Study
The methodical rollout of the patrols and the multiregional, multiagency efforts evident
in the “special operations” strongly suggest that these events manifested a policy shift
decided on, or at least approved, by the party leadership at the central level. What were
the causes of these early moves into the gray zone? Could they have been designed in
part to divert domestic discontent, impress nationalist members of the public, or ward
off internal criticism from hard-liners aligned with public opinion?
Official Comments and State Media. China’s official statements and state media coverage
indicate that these new maritime law-enforcement activities had little or nothing to do
with popular nationalism. This is evident, first, from the fact that none of the actions
was well publicized. The regular rights-defense patrols were the only component of this
set of new policies to have been publicized to domestic mass audiences. One brief March
2007 report from state news agency CNS mentioned the patrols, but this was about nine
months after their implementation and the story was not republished widely.54 It was
only on 12 July 2008, that state television announced that regular rights-defense patrols
were occurring in the South China Sea.55 As for the on-water clashes, the Triton 626 incident only was revealed six years later in a CCTV documentary, while the interference
with Vietnamese continental shelf surveys never has been acknowledged publicly.
The fact that state media discussion of these new gray-zone activities and incidents did
not begin until months or years afterward constitutes solid evidence that the state was
not driven by a need to alleviate legitimacy issues or placate rising nationalist sentiments. The dearth of media coverage is equally inconsistent with the idea of contending
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elites attempting to focus public attention on the issue to bring about policy change or
attack internal rivals. If legitimacy issues were involved in the policy’s causation, the state
should have sought to relieve the pressure through sustained publicity of the assertive
policy, either before or soon after implementation. If contending elites were attempting
to use the issue, it at least should have been covered in certain sectors of the media or
online.
Public Attention and Mobilization. The BSI shows no evidence that either the regular
rights-defense patrols or the coercive on-water operations in the 2006–2008 period were
preceded by any groundswell of online nationalist pique. As figure 2 indicates, there
were no surges in search activity on the “South China Sea” string through 2007 until
22 December, when the raising of a Song dynasty shipwreck named South China Sea 1
(Nanhai 1) just off the coast of Guangdong received major state media attention.
The July 2008 announcement about regular rights-defense patrols on CCTV prompted
the only clear spike in public interest in the South China Sea issue within the online public across 2008 (figure 3).56 The idea that a desire to appeal to popular nationalism was
part of the motivation behind this assertive policy change arguably passes the basic test
Figure 2. Baidu search activity for “South China Sea” (南海), January–December 2007. The
black box indicates the index’s highest daily value for the year, recorded on 22 December.
(Baidu Search Index).

of plausibility as an explanation in this case—the public was informed of the assertive
action, and the state claimed credit for it. But, as noted above, publicity did not begin
until more than a year after the patrol system had been initiated. While the television
segments may have been an example of nationalist posturing, public opinion was not
involved in the causation of the policy itself. What is clear is that there was a spike in
popular attention toward the issue after the central state media publicity, indicating the
strong influence of the state television broadcaster in setting the online public’s agenda.
Explanations. Surging resource values appear to have combined with declining claim
strength to trigger a policy shift. Another necessary, if insufficient, condition for that
shift was new administrative capacity developed in response to the UNCLOS regime.
It likely is not a coincidence that the value of China’s energy imports trebled between
2004 and 2006—just before the PRC’s policies changed. Although the rights-defense
patrols were not aimed directly at securing resources, the CNPC survey operations
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Figure 3. Baidu search activity for “South China Sea,” January–December 2008. The black box
lists the value for the peak on 13 July (Baidu Search Index).

implemented with the aid of coercive escorts were. In fact, the latter are referred to in
party-state materials as part of the PRC’s “offshore oil exploration strategy.”57
In the East China Sea, the higher prices appear to have spurred greater efforts toward
Sino-Japanese joint development of disputed resources. But in the South China Sea, the
opposite occurred, with the PRC’s position suffering a series of setbacks (including the
stalling of the trilateral Joint Maritime Seismic Undertaking), engendering a sense of
threat to the basic viability of China’s claim. Internal sources recommending that decision makers take action to increase China’s presence to “maintain the dispute” and to
“slow down the pace of border negotiations” in some areas offer support for this idea.58
Indeed, in the South China Sea the advent of the UNCLOS regime had weakened
China’s jurisdictional claims greatly around the margins of the nine-dash line—precisely
those areas where regular patrols were rolled out (see figure 4). This suggests that they
may have been intended to compensate for legal weakness.
These moves were made possible by recent acquisitions of high-endurance patrol vessels
developed specifically to enforce the PRC’s maritime-rights claims in the wake of its accession to UNCLOS. International relations theorists typically hold international law to
be either irrelevant (the realist school) or a constraint on states’ confrontational behavior (the liberal school), but in this case it was a key factor behind the PRC’s assertive
policy shift. Until Beijing enshrined the UNCLOS regime’s two-hundred-nautical-mile
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) into its domestic legal system, PRC maritime lawenforcement agencies had no domestic legal basis for seeking control over vast expanses
of maritime space. In fact, the agency that implemented the policy (CMS) was founded
after the passage of the 1998 Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Exclusive
Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf (hereafter EEZ/CS Law). The following year,
the State Council established three national-level CMS fleets and allocated 1.6 billion
yuan (¥1.6 billion) to equip the new agency with thirteen large, new, long-range patrol
boats and five aircraft.59 The project was evidently a complex one, involving exhaustive
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Figure 4. Approximate path of one regular rights-defense patrol in 2012, compiled by author
from route map visible in "Xunhang Nanhai" [Patrolling the South China Sea], aired on 22 July
2012, on CCTV, available at http://tv.cctv.com/2012/12/10/VIDE1355099970602223.shtml.

research before procurement began, and it may have encountered some delays, as the
first ship was delivered only in late 2004.60 The force also needed time to develop the
organizational and logistical capacities and operational experience to make effective use
of its new equipment, which meant staying at sea for prolonged periods. Only once these
long-planned capabilities were in place could the long-planned regular rights-defense
patrol system be rolled out.61
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CMS’s fleet of white hulls also made the new coercive gray-zone actions possible. At
least three of CMS’s first six new cutters participated in the June–July 2007 “special
rights-defense action” to protect the Triton 626 drilling project. The importance of the
new ships is indicated by the fact that at least one was called in from the CMS East Sea
Branch, based more than two thousand kilometers away; the South Sea Branch had two
new ships of its own, but these evidently were not considered sufficient. One of these
units, Haijian 51 (commissioned in November 2005), also was identified as ramming
Vietnamese geological survey ships later in the year, leading some Vietnamese analysts
to speculate that the ship may have been designed especially for this type of task.62 Regardless of whether this is true, it is clear that the availability of these new assets enabled
the operations.
Beijing could not have used its naval capabilities for these kinds of coercive operations.
According to a well-placed researcher, using warships in this way would have carried
an unacceptable risk of escalation to war, and in any case the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) Navy (PLAN) does not have the relevant 职能 (functional role) within China’s
state system.63 The PLAN’s over-the-horizon deterrent presumably backstopped the
operations, but CMS’s particular form of white-hulled law enforcement was equally crucial (if not more so) to making them possible within the parameters of the party-state’s
strategic goals, which have included the avoidance of military conflict. These technical
capabilities were developed, as noted above, specifically to meet the challenges and opportunities that the new international legal regime presented.
Conclusion. Appeasing popular nationalism was not among the CCP’s motivations when
it began its intensification of gray-zone activities in the South and East China Seas. The
system of regular rights-defense patrols was set in motion in the late 1990s with the
PRC’s accession to the UNCLOS regime. The establishment of new civilian maritime
law-enforcement capabilities was followed by a methodical, progressive rollout of regular
patrols across China’s disputed maritime littoral between 2006 and 2007. It also enabled
the deployment of nonmilitary assets to neutralize opposition to Chinese activities in
disputed waters without triggering military escalation. In the South China Sea, this new
willingness to resort to coercion appears to have resulted from a combination of surging
resource prices and new challenges to the viability of the PRC’s position.
The fact that these crucial policy changes were implemented without any public fanfare
disconfirms both the legitimacy and the elite-contention models of popular nationalist
influence on policy. In a vivid illustration of the changes in the CCP’s management of
public opinion detailed in the following case studies, the Triton 626 incident finally was
revealed to the Chinese public in a state television documentary in late 2013—more than
six years later—with dramatic footage from the scene and candid interviews with personnel involved. This was a strong indication of the state’s newfound willingness to claim
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the credit for its acts of maritime assertiveness and to enlist the public’s patriotic energies
in support of its foreign policy goals. Further evidence of this pattern will be seen in
later case studies. However, when Beijing implemented its new policies in 2006–2008, it
evidently was determined to avoid any involvement from the public.

2009–14: Incidents at Sea—Managing Nationalist Sentiments
Case Study 2. The Impeccable Incident, 2009: The United States Goes Public
For five days in early March 2009, Chinese fishing boats and government ships repeatedly harassed USNS Impeccable, a high-tech survey ship conducting sonar surveillance for the U.S. Navy in the South China Sea. According to the Pentagon, Impeccable
was around seventy-five nautical miles east of Hainan Island when the incidents took
place.64 The confrontations culminated on 8 March, when two Chinese fishing boats,
accompanied by one PLAN surveillance vessel, one CMS patrol ship, and one Fisheries
Administration cutter, maneuvered closely around the U.S. ship for several hours.65 The
fishing boats targeted Impeccable’s underwater monitoring equipment, cutting back and
forth across the stern of the ship, where it was trailing a sonar array, attempting to snare
the array with a long pole. Eventually they forced Impeccable into an emergency stop,
prompting the ship’s crew to ready an equipment-destruction sequence.66
The American response was swift and public. On the following day, 9 March, a Defense
Department statement laid out the U.S. version of events in detail, as outlined above,
accusing the Chinese vessels of having “violated the requirement under international law
to operate with due regard for the rights and safety of other lawful users of the ocean.”67
A formal protest was filed with China’s military attaché in Washington. The incident
is now widely considered emblematic of the new coercive element in China’s maritime
policy.68
For analysts attempting to explain the Impeccable incident, nationalist public opinion in
China has endured as one of the likely causes of the PRC’s actions. Robert Ross characterizes the incident as one of a number of “blunders” that resulted from “the party’s
effort to appease China’s nationalists.”69 Thomas Christensen regarded it as typical of the
belligerent behavior attributable to the CCP’s sensitivity to nationalist criticism and an
exaggerated sense of power in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.70
But China’s official comments and state media indicate that the Chinese ships’ behavior was unrelated to any desire to appear tough or assertive for domestic nationalist
audiences. Instead, the Impeccable incident resulted from the PRC’s pursuit of its longstanding and growing interest in opposing foreign military surveillance in the EEZ, in
the context of the unknown intentions of a new U.S. administration that was beset by a
domestic financial crisis.
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Official Comments and State Media. The PRC’s official comments and state media coverage indicate no desire to use the incident to impress the domestic public or forestall
nationalist criticism. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu
addressed the issue in a regular press conference on 10 March (Beijing time), the first
since the United States had made the incident public. According to the official Chineselanguage transcript, Ma stated that “the U.S. claims are seriously contrary to the facts,”
that they “invert black and white,” and that China had lodged a protest against the U.S.
Navy’s close-in surveillance. A separate statement released the following day confirms
that the party-state was more concerned about positioning itself as a victim of illegal
encroachment than with impressing the domestic public with its active resistance to the
American threat.71
While the U.S. side described the PRC ships’ maneuvers as “aggressive,” the official
transcripts of the 10 March MFA press conference and 11 March statement on the issue
contain no mention of any Chinese actions at all, despite the spokesman being asked
numerous specific questions about them.72 The Defense Ministry’s official response followed the same pattern, painting China as the victim of illegal U.S. encroachment, with
only one brief sentence mentioning China’s “normal rights-defense activities.”73 Unusually, numerous serving PLAN commanders also commented publicly on the issue. These
remarks, too, focused on declaring the hypocrisy of the hegemonic United States, not
China’s hard-line actions in response.74 Some high-ranking PLA officers even explicitly
denied that an incident had occurred at all, let alone one involving Chinese boats bravely
defending the sovereignty, rights, and honor of the nation.75 These responses not only
made no attempt to claim credit for the Chinese vessels’ assertive conduct but actively
refused it.
There was no mention of the Impeccable controversy on CCTV’s authoritative 7 pm news
bulletin between 10 March and 30 March. Nor was there any prominent mention of the
incident (or the diplomatic sparring that ensued) on the 10 pm Wanjian Xinwen (Evening
News) produced by the same trusted office.76 The latter ran reports on the MFA’s press
conferences on six occasions between 10 March and 30 March, four of which addressed
South China Sea–related issues, yet the Impeccable incident appears to have escaped
mention.77 Given the strong influence of television in setting China’s domestic news
agenda, as well as the tight state control of these key news bulletins, this is a strong indication that the CCP was not attempting to draw public attention toward the issue, whip
up anger over the U.S. threat, or bolster its nationalist credentials with the public via its
assertive actions.
Striking differences between Chinese- and English-language state media coverage and
between internal and external versions of events confirm how far domestic nationalist
legitimacy was from the CCP’s calculations at this time. In the English-language China
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Daily on 11 March, PLAN rear admirals Lin Yongqing and Zhang Huachun were quoted
defending the actions of the Chinese ships.78 However, neither of these comments affirming the Chinese boats’ actions appears to have been reported in Chinese-language
media.79 A similarly revealing contrast exists between the Fisheries Administration’s
private and public versions of the incident. Publicly, the head of the agency’s South Sea
Regional Bureau claimed that the fishing boats’ actions were “totally spontaneous” and
had nothing to do with the government.80 But in the China Fisheries Yearbook, which is
not readily accessible to the public, the bureau states that it “organized Fisheries Administration vessels and fishing vessels to successfully intercept and expel [Impeccable] from
our country’s EEZ.”81 On each count, the party-state was loath to portray itself domestically as having confronted the United States actively. This makes it highly unlikely that
the Chinese ships’ coercive actions were intended to appease or impress nationalistic
public opinion.
Public Attention and Mobilization. Rather than rising public sentiments pushing the state
into action, publicity of the Impeccable incident itself drove public attention toward the
South China Sea issue (figure 5).82 The BSI rose to a peak of 4,400 on 17 March, when
state media strongly publicized the dispatch of a newly commissioned paramilitary fisheries-patrol ship to the disputed areas as a response to the increasingly tense situation
there, and rumors circulated of a possible evacuation of Chinese citizens from the Philippines.83 These reports were not related directly to Impeccable, but the incident appears
to have increased the public’s appetite greatly for information on the topic around this
time. Thus, if there was nationalist public pressure on the PRC government for assertive
measures, it was probably greater after the Impeccable incident than before—especially
given the state’s official framing of China as the victim of U.S. encroachment.
The Impeccable incident was, of course, not merely a South China Sea incident but also a
matter of Sino-American relations. As the 1999 bombing of the PRC’s Belgrade embassy and the 2001 EP-3 spy plane incident showed, Sino-U.S. confrontations are likely
to spark public attention and mobilization.84 But the PRC showed little sign of concern
with nationalist public opinion in the wake of the Impeccable incident. It did not serve
as a constraint from winding back the on-water harassment; although there were four
other cases of harassment of U.S. surveillance ships in the Yellow Sea over the following
two months, none approached the intensity of the March incident.85 Nor did it prevent
China from engaging in public cooperation with the United States; on the contrary, the
PRC proceeded with a series of high-level diplomatic and military-to-military meetings
stressing Sino-American cooperation.86
From a peak above 4,400 searches, attention levels among Internet users fell away
quickly, as figure 5 shows. This suggests not only that the state was unconstrained from
moderating its conduct toward the United States but that its clear intent to de-escalate
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Figure 5. Baidu search activity on “South China Sea” (南海, 南海问题, and 南海争端) during
Impeccable incident.
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probably sent a powerful moderating signal to domestic audiences.87 In theory, such
signals can enable a state to pursue de-escalation and more-cooperative relations moving
forward.88 As will be seen again in the 2011 cases (see case study 5), this is one way a
state can manage the risks of domestic discontent or unwanted nationalist influence on
foreign policy.
Explanations. The PRC’s actions, most straightforwardly, were aimed at asserting the
party-state’s long-standing policy of opposing military surveillance activities in maritime
areas subject to a Chinese EEZ jurisdictional claim.89 The PRC previously had taken
actions to advance this position, notably in the EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft incident of
2001. In 2009, Chinese personnel on the fishing boats made clear that they wanted to interfere with Impeccable’s underwater sonar monitoring equipment, which probably was
gathering information on China’s submarine fleet. Since 2008, that fleet had included
ballistic-missile submarines—important to China’s nuclear deterrent—based at Yulin
Naval Base at the southeastern tip of Hainan.90 As a simple act of opposition to Impeccable’s surveillance activities, the purpose of the Chinese vessels’ actions hardly could
have been more clear. However, this underlying strategic interest cannot explain easily
the timing of the altered behavior that precipitated the incident. Why did the PRC take
this kind of action over the issue in early 2009, not the previous year or earlier, before
the new submarine facility entered operation?
A tactical probe, triggered by uncertainty over the intentions of a new U.S. administration beset by financial crisis, offers the neatest explanation for the timing of the PRC’s
actions. In all, fishing boats harassed U.S. military surveillance ships in China’s claimed
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EEZs at least five times between March and May 2009.91 Tellingly, no equivalent confrontations have been reported since that time. This shows that, while the operation against
Impeccable served the long-standing geostrategic objectives noted above, it did not
constitute a fundamental shift in China’s policy aimed at compelling the United States
to change its surveillance behavior.92 This suggests that the aim more likely was to gauge
the American response in the context of severe economic uncertainty in the wake of the
global financial crisis of late 2008. Barack Obama’s assumption of the U.S. presidency in
January 2009 added a further incentive for Beijing to seek updated information about
U.S. intentions on China’s maritime periphery at this time, and previous PRC practice
suggests that the change of administration may have been a factor.93
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates understood the incident as a PLA action taken
“without the knowledge of the civilian leadership in Beijing.”94 This is basically compatible with the explanation advanced above, since military leaders themselves conceivably could have organized and executed such a probing action. However, there are
several reasons to question Gates’s interpretation. One is the involvement of at least two
subministerial government agencies—CMS and the Fisheries Administration—and the
requirement for coordination across the civil-military institutional divide, which would
have been difficult (and risky) to conceal from the central party leadership. This coordination, and the fact that the harassment was sustained over a period of several days,
eliminates the possibility of frontline units having acted on their own initiative.
Second, by the evening of 8 March, when the United States made its initial private
protest, MFA officials already were prepared with sufficient information on the incident
to mount a detailed rebuttal, suggesting that the foreign policy bureaucracy, or party
leaders higher up in the system, were cognizant of the actions.95 Fisheries officials have
cited the incident as an example of “fisheries rights defense working in concert with
diplomatic representations.”96
Third, the fact that several more instances of harassment of U.S. surveillance ships
occurred over the following three months suggests that this behavior was not strongly
contrary to the central leadership’s wishes.97
Collectively, these observations suggest that PLA initiatives or preferences, as distinct
from those of the CCP central leadership, are unlikely to have been a factor behind the
confrontation.
As with many of the incidents that have composed China’s assertive shift into the maritime gray zone, the on-water agencies’ actions in the Impeccable incident were connected
intimately with the state’s response to the UNCLOS regime.98 The agencies found legal
authority for their actions in UNCLOS-inspired domestic legal instruments, especially
the 1996 MSR Rules, and CMS ships discovered the spy ship during one of their new
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regular rights-defense patrols—a program that, as noted above, resulted from Chinese
intentions and capabilities developed in direct response to UNCLOS.99 The incident
also demonstrated the feedback loop between new, assertive policies introduced at one
time—in this case, regular patrols that increased China’s maritime domain awareness—
and further assertive actions in subsequent periods. However, the equipment required
for the action against Impeccable probably would have been available to the agencies
before the addition of the new UNCLOS-inspired fleet of long-range patrol boats.100
Thus, while China’s legal argument against the U.S. activities was enabled directly by the
convention, the assertive on-water actions themselves probably were not.
Conclusion. The Impeccable incident resulted from the PRC’s pursuit of its long-standing
stated interest in opposing foreign military surveillance in the EEZ, in the context of the
unknown intentions of a new U.S. administration beset by a domestic financial crisis.
China’s official comments and state media from March 2009 show that the Chinese
ships’ behavior was unrelated to any desire to appear tough or assertive for domestic
nationalist audiences. Equally, as we have seen, the Impeccable incident became public
only at Washington’s initiation, and the PRC made no concerted attempt to channel the
influence of public opinion instrumentally into the service of its maritime policy objectives at that point. But on 25 March, two weeks after the incident, the MFA’s departmental director general did cite rising online nationalism in China in an appeal to U.S.
interlocutors to cut back American offshore surveillance activities.101 This suggests that
PRC diplomats now recognized popular nationalism’s instrumental potential as a 砝码
(bargaining chip) to underpin China’s policy on this issue.102
Case Study 3. Sino-Indonesian Fishing Clashes, 2010–16:
Public Opinion and Policy Contestation
Since 2010, at least four instances have been reported of PRC civilian law-enforcement
ships coercing Indonesian naval vessels into releasing PRC fishing boats at the far
southern extremity of the nine-dash-line area. In each case, Indonesian law enforcement
detained the fishing boats within Indonesia’s EEZ projected from the Natuna Islands,
whose status is not in dispute (figure 6). The location is significant because China has no
plausible basis to claim maritime rights in that area under UNCLOS, so the coercive actions there almost certainly represent enforcement of its claim to “historic rights” within
other countries’ EEZs, alluded to in the PRC’s 1998 EEZ/CS Law. The area also contains
large, though only marginally commercially viable, oil and gas reserves that Indonesia is
pushing to develop, perhaps for strategic reasons.103
This form of gray-zone coercion has not been aimed only at Indonesia; the PRC Fisheries Administration’s yearbook recorded “rescues” of more than a hundred PRC fishermen from the clutches of foreign authorities in the Spratly area in 2010.104 However, the
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Sino-Indonesian incidents were especially significant owing to their location: just inside
the nine-dash line, but outside any plausible PRC EEZ claim under UNCLOS (figure
7).105 This, together with other evidence that includes fisheries charts and Chinese media
accounts, indicates that in taking these actions the PRC Fisheries Administration has
been acting on a new and provocatively expansive reading of the nine-dash line as a
geographical border.106

Figure 6. Approximate locations of major PRC-Indonesia fisheries incidents, 2010–16 (note that
incidents 5 and 6 marked on this chart did not involve coercion by PRC ships). Detail from map
in Connelly, Indonesia in the South China Sea, p. 4.

Beijing’s general policy of strengthening protection for its fishing boats in the disputed
Spratly maritime spaces dates back at least as far as 2003, but the key changes giving rise
to the PRC-Indonesia confrontations did not occur until 2009.107 Throughout the first
decade of the twenty-first century, the Fisheries Administration complained of a lack of
resources and equipment for long-distance missions, admitting that its fleet often was
unable to prevent other countries from detaining Chinese fishermen there, even when
this occurred near the PRC’s outposts.108 New equipment, authority, and techniques arrived in 2009, when Yuzheng 311 and Yuzheng 302 were dispatched to the Spratlys “with
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Figure 7. Approximate location of coercive PRC on-water actions in relation to PRC nine-dash
line and maximum UNCLOS-based claim before the 2016 arbitration ruling that none of the
Spratlys constitutes an “island” under UNCLOS article 121.

the approval of the national relevant departments,” not only to manage the Chinese fleet
but to “exercise the state’s administrative power, and strongly proclaim sovereignty.”109
The exercise, and subsequently the enforcement, of “historic rights” in Indonesia’s Natuna EEZ began in late 2009.110 In mid-2010, reports emerged of two incidents in which
the armed PRC Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) cutter Yuzheng 311
forced the Indonesian navy to release PRC trawlers it had detained.111 In March 2013,
an Indonesian navy captain posted a detailed account of a similar incident, in which the
PRC fisheries-survey ship Nanfeng and the armed cutter Yuzheng 310 had compelled
him to release a Chinese fishing boat.112 And in March 2016, Indonesia’s minister of
marine affairs and fisheries announced that PRC cutters had compelled the release of a
Chinese fishing boat by ramming it as it was being towed toward the Natuna Islands for
processing.113 In the absence of such reports from earlier times, it seems reasonable to
infer that this series of incidents reflects an intensification in the PRC’s gray-zone maritime behavior in this area of maritime space. If so, how can this change be explained,
and how likely is it that nationalist public opinion was a factor?
As shown below, domestic discourse on the matter offers indications that public opinion may have been a factor in an intrastate policy contest that resulted in the coercive
measures to protect Chinese fishermen in the Indonesian EEZ. Specifically, the public’s response to a flurry of media reporting on the plight of Chinese fishermen whom
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Indonesia arrested in mid-2009 may have helped hawkish party-state actors weaken
restraints on confrontational on-water conduct in the area. What makes this plausible is
that the MFA and party leadership had clear reasons to oppose such conduct, for it was
certain to undermine Sino-Indonesian relations, antagonize the largest and most powerful state in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and harm China’s
international image by flouting a globally legitimate international legal regime it once
had extolled as a force for “breaking maritime hegemony.”114
Official Comments and State Media. The MFA appears to have been unprepared to
respond publicly to Indonesian detentions of Chinese fishermen. The MFA made its
first comments on such an incident on 25 June 2009, publicly demanding the release
of seventy-five fishermen detained on eight boats in what the MFA described as “the
traditional fishing grounds of the Spratly Islands.” This comment was offered in response
to a report that the Huanqiu Shibao, a tabloid susidiary of the People’s Daily that often
defines the extremes of acceptable nationalist public discourse, published that morning.
That story, in turn, was based on a translation of Indonesian media content published
two days earlier; the actual incident had occurred three days further back, on 20 June.115
This sequence suggests that the MFA or party leadership may not have been intending to respond publicly to this incident before the media drew attention to the issue.116
If so, this was a case of the media, and by extension public opinion, impacting China’s
diplomatic agenda.
The Huanqiu translation’s scoop formed part of a larger wave of reporting on the South
China Sea in general, and on the plight of Chinese fishermen in particular, in certain
parts of the Chinese media through the first half of 2009. Beyond the Huanqiu piece,
detailed feature reporting came mainly from Xinhua subsidiary International Herald
Leader, the Chinese-language website of the China Daily, and provincial papers such as
the Guangzhou Daily. This assortment of relatively disparate outlets further suggests that
the reports were not the result of a systematic, centrally directed campaign motivated by
strategic or diversionary considerations. Most suggestively, some reports carried explicit
criticisms of the MFA’s lack of support for arrested fishermen, as well as extensive quoting of Fisheries Administration personnel.117 These observations are consistent with particular substate elite actors attempting to enlist public opinion in support of a hawkish
policy shift on this specific issue.
The party-state did not comment publicly on either the 2010 or 2013 incidents. Xinhua
may have issued a brief report on the 2010 incidents, but if so this was quickly taken
down, indicating that diplomatic flexibility was more of a priority for Beijing than was
claiming credit for the assertive actions it already had taken.118 One of the first detailed
Chinese-language reports on the 2013 incident appears to have come two years later,
when CNS ran a heroic account of the role of one fisheries-survey ship in the “rescue.”119
The PRC’s only comment on the 2016 incident was the MFA spokesperson’s 21 March
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press conference remark that “after the relevant fishing vessel was attacked and harassed
by an armed Indonesian ship, a Chinese coast guard ship went to assist and did not
enter the Indonesian territorial waters.” The spokesperson immediately added that some
fishermen remained under detention in Indonesia.
This presentation of these incidents is inconsistent with an attempt to bolster nationalist legitimacy via foreign policy aggression, but is quite consistent with the possibility of
nationalist influence on policy via elite contention. As noted below, data on public attention and mobilization levels offer some further support for such an explanation.
Public Attention and Mobilization. The criticisms of the MFA in the 2009 media reports
on the issue, together with the prominence of Fisheries Administration officials as
sources, suggest that contending elite actors, particularly the Fisheries Administration, may have been attempting to push for a tougher handling of the issue, or for more
resources for fishing-protection missions, or both. The BSI offers solid evidence that this
media coverage had an effect on public opinion, in terms of both attention levels among
the general public and intensity of feeling among already-activated citizens. The flurry of
stories pushed the BSI to a peak above 1,100 (see figure 8). Although the public’s appetite
for information on the topic did not swell to the degree seen in the wake of the Impeccable incident three months prior (see figure 9), the spike was still much bigger than any
peak across the 2006–2008 period.
The media campaign even appears to have had a real-world mobilizing effect, with a
small-scale protest reportedly held in front of the Indonesian embassy in early July—
quite possibly the PRC’s first ever against a Southeast Asian country over the South
China Sea issue.120 Even as tensions eased in the second half of 2009, the BSI remained
more than twice as high as it had been during the same period in earlier years.121 This
indicates that the media campaign did have an effect on public opinion. Whether this
actually tipped the scales in any elite policy contests, helping to produce the change in
behavior from 2010, is difficult to know with certainty, but significant evidence at least
points in this direction.
Explanations. The incidents—at least the publicly reported ones—followed a conspicuous strengthening of China’s fisheries law-enforcement capability, with the arrival of
modern, armed fisheries-enforcement vessels. New ships were involved in most or all of
the incidents.
Yuzheng 311 (now Haijing 3411), a refurbished naval rescue ship commissioned into
the Fisheries Administration fleet in early 2009, reportedly was a protagonist in both
the 2010 incidents.122 Displacing 4,450 tons, it was at the time the agency’s largest vessel,
conducting longer stays at sea in remote areas, as well as offering greater coercive capabilities. It was posted to the disputed area almost immediately after its commissioning.
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Figure 8. Baidu Search Index for “South China Sea” (南海), April–July 2009.

Figure 9. Baidu Search Index for “South China Sea” (南海), full-year 2009. The midyear peak associated with the Indonesian fishing incident is pinpointed with the value 989, while the larger
peak to the left is that which followed the Impeccable incident.

Yuzheng 310, the armed unit involved in the 2013 incident, was a new ship launched in
2010, as was the Nanfeng fisheries resource survey ship involved in the same incident.
Open-source accounts are unclear on which China Coast Guard (CCG) ship performed
the ramming operation in March 2016, although it appears to have been one of the
newer three-thousand-ton cutters.123 Even if it was an older asset that predated the
change in PRC behavior, its availability to operate in such a remote area was enabled by
the fleets’ other new assets.
Official sources allude to the abundant fisheries resources of the disputed areas of the
South China Sea as a motivation for the central policy of encouraging fishing there. As
explained in the China Fisheries Yearbook, in 2008 the South Sea regional branch of the
FLEC “actively guided and encouraged fishing boats to venture to the Paracels, Spratlys,
and Zhongsha for production, reducing pressure on near-seas resources, and exploiting
external-seas resources . . . implementing the accompanying fleet production system,
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solidifying confidence in Spratly production.”124 This suggests that resource depletion
closer to shore may have contributed to the PRC’s sponsorship of the expansion of fishing activities in the “Spratly Southwest Fishing Grounds,” under armed protection.125
There are signs that substate bureaucratic politics also may have contributed. The attachment of the nine-dash line to a 2009 letter to the United Nations was a watershed
moment in the PRC’s South China Sea policy; it was the party-state’s first use of the map
in a public diplomatic document, and could be read as establishing a link between the
line and China’s claims to maritime resource rights.126 In the context of proposals for a
unified maritime law-enforcement fleet—eventually approved in 2013—this may have
had the effect of encouraging PRC maritime law-enforcement agencies to operate at the
margins of the nine-dash line to position themselves as defenders of China’s maritime
“border.”127 If this effect was in fact unwelcome to the central leadership, then this type
of substate envelope pushing may be part of the explanation for the increase in coercive
incidents in Indonesia’s Natuna EEZ. While the Fisheries Yearbook proudly laid claim
to the 2013 incident, the lack of mention of the 2010 incidents offers a faint suggestion
that the practice may not have been in accordance with the center’s wishes at that time.128
As we saw earlier, examination of domestic discourse on the matter suggests that public
opinion may have become a factor in such an intrastate policy contest.
Conclusion. The Indonesia fisheries controversy offers the most likely example of
popular nationalism contributing to assertive on-water conduct via the processes specified by the elite-contention models of public influence on foreign policy. Specifically,
the public’s response to a relatively piecemeal 2009 campaign of media reporting on
the plight of Chinese fishermen arrested by Indonesia quite plausibly helped hawkish
party-state actors weaken restraints on confrontational on-water conduct in the area.
Crucially, the MFA and other decision makers had good reason to oppose such conduct,
as it obviously would bring a new party into the dispute, antagonize ASEAN’s largest
and most powerful state, and harm China’s international image by brazenly flouting an
internationally legitimate legal regime that the PRC had ratified. Thus, the case of the
Sino-Indonesian fishing “rescues” appears to demonstrate some of the key observable
indications of public opinion becoming a factor via elite contestation.
Case Study 4. Diaoyu Fishing Clash, 2010: A Nationalist Hijacking?
On 7 September 2010, Japanese authorities boarded and seized a Chinese fishing boat
near the disputed Diaoyu Islands after it twice had rammed Japan Coast Guard (JCG)
ships.129 On 8 September, Japanese authorities arrested the boat’s skipper, Zhan Qixiong,
on suspicion of obstructing law enforcement, and on 10 September a Japanese court
authorized his detention for ten days while prosecutors considered charging him.130 On
19 September, the detention was extended for a further ten days, but five days later Japan
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backed down, releasing Captain Zhan and declaring that he had not intended to ram the
patrol vessels.131
Over the course of Captain Zhan’s seventeen days in detention, China canceled highlevel exchanges, postponed discussions over energy resources in the disputed area, and
discouraged Chinese tourism to Japan, all while steadily intensifying its public threat
language. The MFA also summoned the Japanese ambassador five times, once during
the middle of the night.132 There also was a widespread belief that China slowed down
exports of important rare earths to Japan as part of its response.133
The collision occurred amid an extraordinary expedition by hundreds of PRC trawlers
to fish in the area in August and September—almost certainly with state support.134 On 9
September, two days after the incident, the MFA announced that Fisheries Administration patrol ships had been sent to the area.135 By 17 September, China had reinforced its
on-water presence further by sending both CMS and Fisheries Administration patrol
ships “to strengthen law-enforcement activities in our relevant waters to safeguard
China’s maritime rights and interests” and had transported building materials and equipment to the disputed Chunxiao oil and gas field.136 Eleven days later, on 28 September,
the MFA declared that 常态化 (normalized) fisheries-protection patrols now were taking
place. To achieve this, the FLEC called in patrol boats from all three regional fisheries
fleets and conducted four such voyages by the end of the year 2010, “in accordance with
the MFA’s arrangements.”137 This new pattern of patrols is apparent in JCG data on entries
into the 24 nm contiguous zone around the disputed islands, as depicted in figure 10.
The case stands as a prime example of China’s policy of incremental, often coercive, but
deliberately nonmilitary advancement of administrative control over disputed areas of
the East China Sea.
Numerous analysts have linked the PRC’s assertive response to the Diaoyu crisis with
nationalist public opinion. Michael Swaine and M. Taylor Fravel wrote that the PRC state
“clearly overreacted, almost certainly in part due to domestic pressure.”138 Zhu Zhiqin
wrote that the incident showed how PRC foreign policy could be “hijacked by public
opinion.”139 Willy W. Lam characterized Beijing’s reactions as “dubious if not irrational
measures to appease nationalists.”140 Alastair Iain Johnston has offered a more qualified
appraisal of the relationship between domestic public opinion and China’s actions during
this period, arguing that Beijing sought to have Captain Zhan released by 18 September
to help “control anti-Japanese demonstrations” around the key anniversary of Japan’s
1931 invasion.141
But did the CCP’s undoubted concern with nationalist criticism actually affect its
conduct on the water? As shown below, the evidence from China’s domestic discourse
is consistent with both the legitimacy model and the instrumental model of popular
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Figure 10. Institution of “normalized” patrolling near Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands from September
2010. Adapted from Japan Coast Guard chart.

nationalism’s role in foreign policy. But when we consider the strength of alternative explanations for the PRC’s on-water actions and its attempt to deter Japan from prosecuting Captain Zhan, the instrumental model emerges as the more compelling explanation.
Official Comments and State Media. MFA spokespersons commented on the issue on at
least sixteen separate occasions over the month following the incident, addressing the
issue in seven routine press conferences and releasing nine spokesperson statements.
Importantly, these official comments publicly flagged an uncompromising response
from the first opportunity. On the day of the incident, 7 September, the MFA announced
that it had lodged a protest with the Japanese government over the detention of the
fishing boat, and added that China was “demanding Japanese patrol boats not engage
in so-called ‘law enforcement’ activities in waters near Diaoyu Island” and “reserves the
right to make further response.” The following day, it announced that Assistant Foreign
Minister Hu Zhengyue had summoned Japan’s ambassador and “demanded the Japanese
side release the detained Chinese ship and crew members immediately.”142 On 9 September, the MFA spokesperson also confirmed that Fisheries Administration ships had
been sent to Diaoyu waters to “safeguard fishery production order as well as the safety of
Chinese fishermen’s lives and property,” making clear that this was part of the government’s response to the incident.
The MFA’s comments and statements consistently highlighted both the rightfulness
of the detained fishermen’s activities and the Chinese government’s strong support
for them. MFA statements and press conferences announced or confirmed the raft of
measures the Chinese government was taking to punish Japan for its “incorrect” actions, including sending patrol ships to the area (9 September), postponing scheduled
negotiations over the East China Sea issue (11 September), canceling a National People’s
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Congress (NPC) delegation’s visit to Japan (14 September), sending CMS and Fisheries
Administration patrol ships to the area and increasing unilateral activities in the disputed Chunxiao oil and gas field (17 September), ruling out a meeting between Premier
Wen Jiabao and Japanese leaders at the United Nations, suspending bilateral exchanges
at and above the ministerial level, and advising travel agencies against booking tours to
Japan (21 September).
Central state media continuously emphasized the events of September 2010 as a decisive
victory for China, thanks to the efforts of the Chinese government. The first CCTV 新
闻联播 (Network News) report on the crisis, broadcast on 13 September—the day Japan
released the boat and crew, but not the captain—was a succinct summary of this official media narrative: “Following stern representations from the Chinese government,
today fourteen Chinese fishermen illegally detained by Japan boarded a Chinese
government–chartered plane and returned safely to Fuzhou. The Chinese fishing boat
illegally detained by Japan also commenced its return journey, and the Chinese government has sent Fisheries Administration ships to relevant waters to aid it.” A report
from the scene of the fishermen’s return at Fuzhou airport followed, with the reporter
repeating that the plane was “sent by the Chinese government” and that a “joint work
group” of officials from the MFA, Fisheries Administration, and Fujian Province had
been on the plane with them. The only comment from any of the fishermen came from
Wang Guohua, who thanked the government first for “this opportunity to return to the
motherland” before expressing strong support for the government’s stance.143 CCTV Network News’ report on Captain Zhan’s return twelve days later followed exactly the same
formula: emphasizing his safe return on a Chinese government–chartered plane, accompanied by MFA, Fisheries Administration, and Fujian officials, and showing scenes of
Captain Zhan thanking the government and declaring his support for its stance.144
Besides these tales of human interest and state-led national triumph, CCTV also made
sure the nation knew about the party-state’s uncompromising stance on the issue and the
specific measures taken to punish Japan. When Captain Zhan’s detention was extended
on 19 September, the 7 pm Network News made no mention of this setback, but reported
that the incident now had “seriously damaged Sino-Japanese bilateral exchanges.” Citing
an MFA source, the report stated as follows:
China has already suspended bilateral ministerial-level exchange, halted bilateral contact
regarding increased flights and expanded overflight rights, and delayed the Sino-Japanese
Comprehensive Meeting on Coal. The scope of Chinese citizens going to Japan for tourism has also already been seriously affected. The MFA stated that the above-mentioned
situations are totally Japan’s responsibility, and the Japanese side must immediately release
the Chinese captain or else it must bear all the ensuing consequences.145
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CCTV’s 10 pm Evening News also covered China’s activities around the Chunxiao oil
and gas field, and announced the “normalization” of Fisheries Administration patrols in
Diaoyu waters on 28 September.146
Significantly, in New York on 22 September, Premier Wen Jiabao explicitly threatened
“necessary countermeasures” if the captain was not released. Premier Wen’s public threat
formed the subject of a ninety-second report that was broadcast on Network News on 22
September.147 The high domestic publicity accorded to the government’s punishment of
Japan and its top leaders’ personal threats of escalation was exactly the opposite of the
trend observed after the Impeccable incident (case study 2), when China’s assertive actions had escaped all but the briefest mention and reporting of tough-sounding official
remarks mostly had been limited to English-language state media outlets.
When Japan relented, CCTV Network News immediately announced Captain Zhan’s
impending return, introducing the news via a journalist at the MFA press conference,
who opened his question by stating the following: “According to reports, Japan had no
choice but to release the Chinese captain Zhan Qixiong.”148 The clear implication was
that the Chinese government’s strong stance had forced Japan to back down. The 10
pm Evening News bulletin the same night added that the Japanese cabinet secretary had
pledged to “work to restore Sino-Japanese relations,” thus acceding to another of China’s
official demands: that Japan make the first move to mend relations.149 China responded
the next day with an official foreign ministry statement demanding compensation and
an apology.150
On the other hand, throughout the crisis the PRC deliberately projected to international
audiences an image of being under pressure from domestic public opinion. In the MFA’s
9 September regular press conference, Jiang Yu declared that Japan’s actions had “met
strong reaction from the Chinese public.” Declaring the government to be “unswerving
in its determination and resolve to maintain sovereignty and territorial integrity,” Jiang
linked the public’s reaction with “further escalation” if the crew were not released. Over
the next two weeks, top officials all the way up to Premier Wen Jiabao repeated the core
message of demanding the release of the detained captain while linking public opinion
to the threat of strong countermeasures if Japan did not comply.151 An obvious corollary
was that further Japanese interference with the PRC’s upgraded fishing and patrolling
activities would carry even greater risks of escalation. Of course, a state being driven
to escalate a crisis under pressure from nationalist public opinion also would seek to
make its foreign interlocutors understand this. But it is also plausible that these references to public opinion were part of the PRC’s attempt to convince Japan to drop its legal
proceedings and accept the new patrolling activities, rather than constituting an accurate
explanation for the PRC’s escalatory on-water policy.
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In sum, official comments and state-controlled media coverage make clear that the
party-state made a concerted attempt to portray its response domestically as proactive,
strong, and successful. The centralized sourcing and dissemination of a consistent party
line are in keeping with the legitimacy model, which characterizes the state’s assertive
foreign policy actions as motivated by concern for its nationalist credentials, while ruling
out the elite-contention model of nationalist influence. But the quantity and quality
of official information are also consistent with a state instrumentally drawing public
attention toward the issue for diplomatic advantage. Reviewing the timing of the surges
in public attention levels may shed additional light on which of these two models best
describes this critical gray-zone case.
Public Attention and Mobilization.The Diaoyu fishing boat crisis was bound to cause a
stir among the members of the Chinese public. Poll results dating back to the early 1990s
suggest that sections of the Chinese public long have held a keen interest in the issue of
the Diaoyu Islands.152 On the other hand, the long-running Sino-Japanese joint Genron/
NPO opinion poll showed that, as of mid-2010, the general population’s attitudes toward
Japan had been growing steadily more positive each year since 2005.153 Nonetheless, the
Diaoyu 2010 crisis occurred at a time of year when anti-Japanese sentiments are brought
forth most easily: close to 18 September, China’s anniversary of the beginning of Japan’s
1931 invasion. This timing ensured that the PRC public would be paying attention to
the issue, a point that can be demonstrated by retracing the course of the rise in public
attention using the BSI.
Public attention levels already were higher than usual when the fishing boat incident occurred.154 On 7 September, the BSI rose from around 1,100 to above 9,000. The following
day it jumped to 38,000, and by 10 September it was above 60,000 (see figure 11). This
suggests that at this point in time interest in the topic among Internet users was orders
of magnitude higher than at any previous time since measurements began in mid2006.155 Nationalist groups also mobilized small-scale anti-Japan protests in Beijing on 8
September.156 Thus, when China dispatched fisheries-patrol boats on 9 September, and
especially after Japan made its decision on 10 September to keep the captain in detention, Beijing was probably facing the highest level of domestic public attention in years.
It would not be surprising if Beijing’s subsequent dispatch of fisheries-patrol ships, the
postponement of scheduled talks on joint development of oil and gas resources, and the
cancelation of the NPC delegation’s visit to Japan were driven by concern with keeping
this surge in public sentiment under control.
The sequence of elevated public attention levels before the incident, and particularly
from 8 September onward, followed by the adoption and announcement of escalatory measures on 9 September and again on 17 September, ahead of the sensitive date,
circumstantially supports the proposition that the PRC state’s actions were driven in
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Figure 11. Surge in Baidu search activity on the term “Diaoyu Islands,” September 2010.

part by the surging domestic nationalist sentiments. So too does the fact that anti-Japan
street protests involving several hundred people took place in several Chinese cities on
18 September. These protests preceded a further toughening of the PRC’s stance on 21
September and the eventual enactment of “normalized” fisheries patrolling on 28 September, leaving open the possibility that placating an enraged nationalist public formed
part of the motivation for those escalatory actions. However, it is not clear whether the
high volume of official rhetoric and hard-line countermeasures announced before 18
September placated the public’s patriotic sentiments or stimulated them.
Chinese security agencies worked hard to restrict the scale and intensity of the antiJapanese protests on 18 September, the most significant nationalist anniversary of the
year.157 Jessica Chen Weiss theorizes that this was intended to signal the CCP leadership’s
commitment to keeping relations on track.158 But, as noted above, throughout the crisis
the PRC’s projection of the image of being under pressure from domestic public opinion
to international audiences also telegraphed a threat of escalation. The evidence from
China’s domestic discourse in relation to the issue therefore is consistent with both the
legitimacy model of nationalism as a foreign policy driver and the instrumental model
of nationalism as a foreign policy resource; however, once we consider the strength of
alternative explanations for the PRC’s on-water actions and its attempt to deter Japan
from prosecuting Captain Zhan, the instrumental model emerges stronger.
Explanations. China’s policy in the East China Sea had been hardening for several years
before the 2010 crisis erupted, especially in the gray zone of maritime law enforcement
and fishing militia. The SOA introduced its system of regular rights-defense patrols in
2006 (see case study 1), PRC patrol boats entered the 12 nm territorial seas around the
Diaoyu Islands for the first time in December 2008, and CMS patrolling activities in the
East China Sea intensified the following year.159 The PRC also had restarted unilateral
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development of disputed oil and gas fields in 2009 and, according to Japanese officials,
had flown helicopters dangerously close to a Japanese destroyer in April 2010.160 And,
as noted above, Captain Zhan’s ramming of the JCG vessel occurred amid a major surge
in state-sponsored fishing activities in the area; Japanese authorities observed unprecedented numbers of PRC fishing boats within the territorial seas in August and September 2010.161 All this suggests that the assertive changes in PRC policy toward the Diaoyu
Islands may have predated the trawler collision. If so, the surge of popular nationalism
seen in the wake of the incident could not have been a cause of Beijing’s assertive onwater policy shift.
Chinese government sources have referred to the institutionalization of PRC fisheries
patrolling in response to the 2010 incident as a turning point, suggesting that PRC leaders may have recognized the opportunity the crisis presented to go a step further with its
“countermeasures” against Japan and to use its new capabilities to change the status quo
in China’s favor, with the public’s anti-Japanese agitation helping to ensure that Tokyo
would not oppose this.162 Yet positive changes in the balance of power are by no means
the whole story, for China also was responding to what it perceived as a serious weakening in its claim to the islands.
There is compelling evidence that the PRC leadership perceived that criminal charges
against Captain Zhan would strengthen significantly Japan’s claim to the islands, with a
correspondingly deleterious effect on China’s own claim to the islands.163 Captain Zhan
had rammed two Japanese government ships, but nonetheless, because the incident
occurred in Diaoyu territorial waters, a trial under domestic law would stand as a clear
demonstration of Japan’s territorial administration of the islands. It also, in China’s view,
ignored an important political aspect of the 1997 Sino-Japanese Fishery Agreement, under which the waters around the Diaoyu Islands were maintained as “free fishing zones”
within which flag-state laws would apply.164 Thus, China may have perceived strong
incentives to seek to deter Japan from proceeding with the domestic charges. China’s
subsequent actions were consistent with Fravel’s theory that states are more inclined to
engage in escalatory behavior when faced with declines in the strength of their claims
over disputed territories they do not control.165 Three pieces of evidence support this
explanation.
First, MFA officials repeatedly stressed the point that any “so-called judicial proceedings” against the captain of the fishing boat were illegal and invalid. When the Japanese
government backed down on 24 September, MFA spokesperson Jiang responded, “I
would like to reiterate that Japan’s adoption of any form of so-called judicial procedures
over the Chinese captain is illegal and invalid.” The 25 September MFA statement—
China’s most formal and authoritative encapsulation of the official line on the issue—
specifically highlighted this contention.166 MFA spokespersons have reiterated China’s
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opposition to Japanese judicial proceedings in their answers about the topic in July 2011,
May 2012, and February 2014. The consistent emphasis on the judicial proceedings suggests the Chinese state was less concerned about the nationalist hot-button issue of the
Japanese state’s detention of the captain than the more anodyne administrative matter of
his processing under domestic Japanese law.
Second, before the “so-called judicial proceedings” became likely on September 10,
China’s handling of the incident had been fairly moderate by comparison with previous
practice. The 2004 landing and detention of activists on the Diaoyu Islands are roughly
analogous to the first three days of the 2010 crisis, as a case of citizen actions in the
disputed area demanding a policy response from the CCP authorities. The 2004 incident
lasted only from 24 March to 26 March, but China’s official response over that span was
harsher than in the first three days of the 2010 incident. In the earlier case, on the day
the activists were detained, Vice–Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui demanded the activists’
immediate release and warned that noncompliance would “arouse the powerful indignation of the Chinese people.” Underscoring this point, the next day small but angry demonstrations were permitted outside the Japanese embassy in Beijing, where protesters
burned a Japanese flag.167 On the first day of the 2010 incident, by contrast, Vice–Foreign
Minister Song Tao merely lodged Beijing’s objection to the “illegal interception of Chinese fishing boats” and apparently made no threat of escalation comparable to Zhang’s
six years earlier.168 China in 2010 also waited until the second day before demanding the
fishermen’s release via Assistant Foreign Minister Hu Zhengyue, an official of lower rank
than Zhang in 2004.
Third, the timing of China’s subsequent escalations also signaled that the problem was
with Japan’s use of its domestic judicial process. Diplomatic protests were elevated from
vice foreign minister to foreign minister on 10 September, when Japan decided to detain
Captain Zhan pending charges. The second extension of Captain Zhan’s detention, on
19 September, prompted an expression of “strong indignation and protest” from Vice–
Foreign Minister Wang Guangya, as well as an MFA spokesperson statement threatening
“strong countermeasures, for which Japan shall bear all the consequences” if it did not
change course. This raises the possibility that the Chinese CMS and Fisheries Administration patrols at Diaoyu were intended as part of the threat-signaling effort aimed at
forestalling legal proceedings against Captain Zhan.
In sum, the major explanatory factors were an existing toughening trend in PRC policy
applied on the water in the East China Sea since 2006, the strength of the PRC’s perception that there was an urgent need to prevent Japan from exercising its planned domestic
legal processes, and the recent acquisition of new patrol boats to enable a near-constant
presence in the area. Considered together, these offer a compelling explanation for the
course of action China chose to take on the water. This decreases the likelihood that
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domestic nationalist legitimacy concerns motivated China’s on-water actions, leaving the
instrumental model as the most plausible explanation of the role of popular nationalism
in China’s maritime policy in this case.
Conclusion. The party-state’s words and actions make clear that its main objective during
the crisis was to deter Japan from applying domestic judicial procedures against Captain
Zhan, but it also took the opportunity to use its growing white-hulled capabilities to
patrol the nearby waters with unprecedented intensity and reinforce its offshore energy
installations in the area. The strength of various rationales for doing this calls into question the interpretation of China’s response as an overreaction. China’s official comments
and state media coverage indicate it is possible that nationalist pressure contributed
to the PRC’s adoption of hard-line measures to punish Japan during the crisis, but the
strength of alternative explanations leaves it unlikely to have had a material effect on
China’s on-water behavior during the crisis.
During the 2010 Diaoyu crisis, the CCP prominently announced the measures it was
taking to punish Japan, made sure the events were portrayed as a diplomatic victory, and
directed credit toward the government. However, it is doubtful that any of the assertive steps taken against Japan on the water would have been absent if not for domestic
nationalist public opinion. To be sure, the measures made for good publicity material
with which to burnish the government’s nationalist credentials, but the PRC’s words
and actions during the crisis (and since then) have indicated the seriousness with which
Beijing viewed the prospect of Tokyo taking domestic judicial action against Captain
Zhan—a message the PRC could not state openly without further compromising its legal
claim. The likely ramifications this would have had for China’s claim to the islands suggest that backing down on the question of Captain Zhan was never an option; if so, then
any nationalist constraint from a more moderate handling of that aspect of the issue is
moot. Indeed, as we saw, whatever fears of nationalist criticism the CCP leaders may
have held did not prevent them from discouraging and restricting anti-Japan protests
on the most sensitive date of the year. Fear of instability evidently outweighed fear of
nationalist criticism.
This explanation for China’s actions also calls into question the idea that China’s
response was “hijacked” by public opinion or was an overreaction brought on in part
by domestic pressure. Given the implications of Toyko’s “so-called judicial proceedings,” the assertive actions Beijing took may well have been completely rational from
the leadership’s perspective. This is all the more likely when we consider the evidence of
whole-of-government coordination in China’s response. The carefully timed escalations
of diplomatic rhetoric, the postponing of scheduled meetings, the threats of additional
“countermeasures,” the simultaneous stimulation and constraining of anti-Japanese
nationalist protests, the tourism boycotts, and the shows of official presence in nearby
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waters—all reasonably could be expected to help with the task of deterring Japan from
a course of action China evidently perceived as inimical to its interests. Thus, while the
party-state may have designed its policy measures with one eye on public opinion, its
actions are explainable without reference to nationalism as an influence.
Not only did China’s approach succeed in convincing Japan not to proceed with charges
against the captain; the PRC actually came out of the crisis with a stronger on-water
presence around the islands. It had sent government patrol ships to the surrounding
waters for the first time since 2008, carried out maintenance on its unilateral East China
Sea energy installation, and instituted a new regime of “normalized” fisheries patrols.
These tactical gains, and the subsequent repetition of this pattern in 2012, further
diminish the likelihood that a nationalist-driven overreaction was a significant factor
behind the PRC’s actions during the 2010 Diaoyu crisis.
Case Study 5. Reed Bank and the Sino-Vietnamese Cable Cuttings, 2011
On 2 March 2011, the energy-survey ship MV Veritas Voyager called for help from the
Philippine Coast Guard and armed forces, reporting that CMS South Sea Fleet patrol
boats Haijian 71 and Haijian 74 had threatened to ram it.169 The incident forced the
French ship to suspend the energy surveys it was conducting on behalf of the Philippine
company Forum Energy in the Reed Bank. Also known in the Philippines as Recto Bank
and in China as 礼乐滩 (Liyue Tan), this expanse of relatively shallow ocean located on
the northeastern edge of the Spratly Islands has been estimated to contain up to 3.4 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.170 According to Maj. Gen. Juancho M. Sabban of the Philippine military’s Western Command, the CMS boats “ordered [MV Veritas Voyager] to
stop and leave the area because it’s supposedly Chinese territory.” Sabban said the survey
ship had been operating approximately 250 km from the coast of Palawan.171
The Philippines responded by sending two lightly armed air force planes to the area, as
well as two coast guard ships to guard the contracted vessel from further harassment
while it completed the survey.172 On 4 March, President Benigno S. Aquino III announced that the Department of Foreign Affairs had lodged a formal protest with the
Chinese embassy.173
Over two months later, on 26 May, three CMS patrol ships confronted a PetroVietnam
energy-exploration vessel, Binh Minh 02, around 120 nm from the coast of central Vietnam, and severed its seismic-survey cable. The company released a video of the incident
in which the survey ship’s crew is heard warning the CMS ship Haijian 84 over two-way
radio: “You are acting very stupidly and dangerously, stay away from the cable.”174 According to Binh Minh 02’s Russian skipper, the Chinese ships announced that the ship
was violating Chinese sovereignty and demanded it leave the area.175 The three CMS
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ships then cut back and forth across the Vietnamese vessel’s stern until the seismic cables
it was towing were cut. In all, the confrontation lasted about three hours.
The Vietnamese government responded with a vigorous diplomatic protest, demanding
compensation and accusing China of violating UNCLOS, the ASEAN-PRC Declaration
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, and the consensus of the two countries’ high-ranking leaders.176
A similarly intense Vietnamese protest followed on 9 June after a Chinese fishing boat
ensnared the survey cable of Viking II, another survey ship conducting seismic research for PetroVietnam in disputed waters farther south. The Vietnamese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) alleged that the incident was “totally intentional, thoroughly
deliberated, and planned,” with the Chinese fishing boat having been equipped with a
“specialized cable slashing device.” Viking II had been operating in a Vietnamese energy
concession known as Block 136/03, located in the Vanguard Bank several hundred
kilometers south of the site of the 26 May incident. The MOFA spokesperson named two
boats from the PRC’s South Sea regional fisheries law-enforcement fleet, Yuzheng 311
and Yuzheng 303, that had been on hand to support the fishing boat, and declared that
the incident had been intended to “realize” China’s nine-dash-line claim.177
Since that time, observers have cited this series of incidents as examples of the “strident”
approach of a PRC state trying to “play to the popular nationalist gallery” and “appease
China’s nationalists.”178 Once again, however, the CCP’s presentation of the issue to its
domestic public shows this to be highly unlikely, and there are much stronger explanations for the PRC’s assertive actions. Nine months on from the successful campaign to
pressure Japan into releasing a fishing boat captain detained in the East China Sea, this
case offered the earliest strong evidence of the PRC drawing on the energy of nationalist
public opinion to advance its diplomatic goals in the South China Sea.
Official Comments. The PRC foreign ministry addressed the Reed Bank incident only
indirectly. On 8 March, in answer to a general question on “countries including Japan
and the Philippines” reportedly lodging protests over maritime issues, spokesperson
Jiang Yu reaffirmed China’s policy of resolving disputes through peaceful negotiation
and of seeking joint development, which she described as a “strategic choice.” Jiang’s response made no reference to the actions of the CMS ships six days earlier.179 In a followup comment made two weeks later, seemingly in response to a state media reporter’s
prearranged question, Jiang declared the Philippines’ exploration activities to be “illegal
and invalid.”180 Once again, however, Jiang made no reference at all to the CMS vessels’
coercive actions.
The Binh Minh 02 incident became public on 27 May, and the MFA addressed the issue
in an ad hoc statement from Jiang in response to foreign media inquiries on 28 May, a
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Saturday. Neither the statement’s content nor the circumstances in which it was issued
suggested an attempt to gain domestic political mileage from the event. Public demand
for South China Sea information is cyclically lower on weekends, so if the state’s aim
was to draw public attention to the event it could have made the statement on either the
preceding Friday or the following Monday. The PRC’s foreign and defense ministries
had not responded to foreign reporters’ requests for comment on Vietnam’s accusations
on 27 May. But with no scheduled press conference until 31 May, the statement on 28
May almost certainly was an ad hoc response to the rapidly growing international media
coverage rather than an attempt to draw domestic attention toward the issue.
Far from foregrounding the strong and coercive nature of China’s actions—for instance,
by praising the CMS crews for upholding sovereignty or defending maritime rights—
Jiang’s 28 May statement referred to China’s actions merely as 正常海洋执法监察活动
(normal maritime law-enforcement surveillance activities). Regarding the Viking II incident, the MFA declared it an accident while characterizing the Chinese fishing boat as a
victim of “illegal chasing” by the Vietnamese side.181 Throughout the monthlong period
of heightened tensions, the MFA carefully avoided the kinds of terminology that might
have implied that coercion had been used against foreign targets, such as “rights defense”
(维权), “expulsion” (驱赶) or “putting a stop to” (制止) objectionable foreign activities.182 China’s official comments also were followed by clear reaffirmations of China’s
desire to resolve the disputes “peacefully through friendly consultation” and, even at the
peak of the tensions in mid-June, explicitly “not resorting to force or threat of force.”183
None of these responses are consistent with the proposition that China’s assertive actions
had been aimed at assuaging popular nationalist criticism.
Comments from more-senior officials during this period also were inconsistent with
interpretations of China’s assertive actions as an attempt to impress the domestic
nationalist citizenry. In the wake of the Binh Minh 02 incident, defense minister Gen.
Liang Guanglie told the Shangri-La Dialogue security forum that the situation in the
South China Sea was “stable” and that the channels of dialogue were running smoothly.
Later that month, Vice–Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai attracted international attention by commenting that “some countries are playing with fire” and that he hoped the
United States would not be burned.184 However, this remark was made to a group of
foreign reporters ahead of an international meeting, and may not have been intended
for domestic consumption.185 In fact, the following day CCTV ran a report explicitly
questioning the comment’s veracity, describing it as an example of the U.S. media’s 演绎
和发挥 (inference and conjecture) for their own unscrupulous purposes.186 Cui’s comment showed that, once again, CCP officials were apparently more inclined to strike a
hard-line stance in front of foreign audiences than domestic ones, as in the wake of the
Impeccable incident two years earlier (case study 2). Such external-first threat signaling is
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consistent with a strategy of international deterrence, not domestic nationalist posturing.
Domestically, the most heavily publicized leadership rhetoric across this period was state
councilor Dai Bingguo’s 26 June remarks following his meeting with Vietnamese special
envoy Ho Xuan Son, which by contrast reiterated that the two countries would resolve
their disputes through negotiations and would maintain peace at sea.187
In sum, Chinese leaders’ domestically directed remarks made no attempt to take credit
for the assertive gray-zone actions of PRC maritime law-enforcement agencies—although equally they did not suggest an attempt to channel nationalist emotion instrumentally toward the issue. However, state media coverage and online activity data offer
some evidence in favor of the latter proposition.
State Media. Translations of foreign news reports led domestic media coverage of the
Reed Bank issue. A short summary of an Agence France-Presse story on the Philippines’ allegations of harassment in the Reed Bank on 3 March was reposted a handful of
times on mainstream news portals, including both the commercial Sina News and the
State Council–affiliated CNS, under the headline “Philippines Claims ‘Harassment’ by
Chinese Patrol Boats, Deploys Fighter Jets to South China Sea.” A more detailed translation of a Time magazine (U.S.) report on the incident appeared on Huanqiu Wang on 7
March and was republished in PRC media at least fourteen times under the rather more
stirring headline “Philippines Claims Oil Exploration Ship Harassed by Chinese Patrol
Boats in Spratlys and Forced to Retreat.” A 9 March report from the website’s Manila
correspondent also was republished at least eleven times.188
The media’s commercial and professional imperatives are the most likely explanation for
this coverage, rather than the state, or elements within it, attempting to direct public attention toward the issue. The central authorities’ most influential mass medium, CCTV,
did not broadcast any reports on the Reed Bank incident in its major news bulletins,
nor was the issue mentioned in the People’s Daily.189 The reaffirmation of China’s stated
desire to resolve the disputes peacefully was one of the most prominent stories on the
South China Sea issue during this period, not promoting a narrative that the CCP was
taking a hard-line stance on the matter.190 The media’s reliance on translations of foreign reports also indicated authorities were making little effort to control the framing of
the incident in domestic online media.
The party-state made little effort to draw the public’s attention toward the Binh Minh
02 and Viking II incidents, whether for reasons of domestic legitimacy or diplomatic
advantage. Chinese commercial media and military enthusiasts picked up on foreign
media reports about the incidents, but the central party-state’s most important and
influential television news programs steadfastly ignored the issue.191 Only on 26 June,
when state councilor Dai Bingguo met with Vietnamese vice–foreign minister Ho Xuan
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Son, did the key news bulletins of national broadcaster CCTV make any mention of the
South China Sea. That evening, tightly scripted reports on the meeting were pushed out
across commercial and state-run media platforms, stating that Dai and Son had agreed
that the two countries would be “good friends, good neighbors, good comrades, good
partners.”192 Online and print media coverage of the Binh Minh 02 incident was led by
Xinhua’s report on the MFA spokesperson’s response. Among more than one hundred
online news articles sampled from the Baidu News archive, none carried a prominent
headline characterizing the incident as an 驱逐, 驱赶 (expulsion or chasing away) of the
Vietnamese survey vessels.193
The Huanqiu Shibao’s editorial line lurched back and forth between confrontational and
moderate rhetoric. Its editorial on 31 May carried the headline “Vietnam’s Risky Ideas
in SCS Increase, China’s Restraint Has Limits” and, as shown below, appears to have increased public attention greatly on the issue.194 However, another editorial, on 9 June, ostensibly reprimanding Vietnam for allowing anti-Chinese protests the previous weekend,
also made clear that China would not be following suit: “Anger Is Not the Right Way to
Handle the South China Sea Dispute.”195 A third notable editorial, published on 21 June
under the headline “Use Two Means to Prepare Response to Vietnam’s Provocations,”
swung back toward confrontation: “China has to be ready for two plans: negotiate with
Vietnam for a peaceful solution, or answer the provocation with political, economic, or
even military counterstrikes.”196
One explanation for this inconsistency would be that competing substate interests were
battling to influence the paper’s editorial line. But the inflammatory editorials appeared
after the incidents, and therefore cannot explain China’s on-water behavior. A stronger
explanation would be that central propaganda authorities were seeking to demonstrate to
the Vietnamese side that the Chinese public also was becoming agitated over the issue.
Public Attention. The Reed Bank incident had minimal impact on the level of Chinese
public demand for information on the South China Sea dispute in early 2011. As seen in
case study 2, the Baidu Index for South China Sea search terms briefly rose above 4,400
following the Impeccable incident in 2009. The average value remained consistently
above 1,400 through late 2010, but by January 2011 it had fallen back to around 1,000. It
stayed there for several months, including through the period of the Reed Bank incident.
As figure 12 shows, the issue began to rise on the online public’s agenda in 2011, in response not to the Reed Bank incident itself but to tougher official rhetoric and domestic
media coverage in April portraying the party-state as adopting an increasingly assertive
stance. This confirms that the Chinese party-state did not launch the first of this series
of coercive gray-zone actions in response to rising pressure from China’s technologically
empowered online population.
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Interest levels were tailing off again by late May, when the first Sino-Vietnamese cablecutting incident occurred.197 But following the MFA’s ad hoc comments on 28 May and
wide syndication of the Huanqiu’s threatening “risky ideas” editorial, the issue suddenly
took hold in the public’s imagination. The BSI accelerated to nearly 4,000 on 31 May,
around the level seen after the Impeccable incident, and hit a new all-time high above
6,300 on 4 June. (The impact of this editorial on existing attention levels at that time is
more apparent on the smaller scale of figure 12.) Demand for South China Sea information had just started to fall back when the Viking II incident took place on 9 June,
Figure 12. Baidu Search Index for “South China Sea” (南海, 南海问题, and 南海争端) in earlyto-mid 2011.
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but after this an unprecedented surge made all earlier periods of heightened information demand appear as minor blips in comparison. The BSI for the South China Sea
search terms hit 27,000 on 17 June and remained above 10,000 through the rest of the
month—a level more than double the highest-ever single-day reading before this period
of tensions began (figure 13). The South China Sea finally had taken hold in the public
imagination—but this appears to have been an effect of the PRC’s assertive conduct, not
a cause.
The sense of an impending showdown in the South China Sea drove a massive surge in
public interest levels. Heavy coverage of Vietnamese live-fire naval drills—the subject
of more than 170 articles published on major commercial news portals between 10 and
15 June—suggested that war was a genuine possibility. Reports of anti-Chinese protests
in Vietnam and Hanoi’s announcement of new military draft guidelines appeared to
confirm this trajectory. China’s actions and semiofficial media matched the escalatory
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Figure 13. Baidu search activity on “South China Sea” (南海, 南海问题, and 南海争端) through
mid-2011.
March-September 2011
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trend. The Maritime Safety Administration—not normally known as an implementer of
assertive policies—attracted attention by announcing that its largest patrol ship, Haixun
31, would shortly sail through the disputed island groups. Excitement hit a new peak
after 14 June, when the PLAN publicized three military drills of its own, including amphibious island-seizing operations, with embedded correspondents projecting dramatic
on-scene reporting and imagery to citizens.198 Military media “hawks,” including Maj.
Gen. Luo Yuan and Rear Adm. Yin Zhuo, further stoked the drama; “Luo Yuan Says
China Is South China Sea Victim, Has Suffered Again and Again” was a 15 June headline
on the People’s Daily–affiliated news portal. Prominent reports of the Philippines’ alleged
“demolition” of Chinese sovereignty markers in the Spratly Islands further implied that
China was being besieged from multiple directions.199
Beneath the general public’s surging interest in the issue, a wave of more-extreme
nationalist mobilization swelled. This too appears to have been triggered by the sense of
impending confrontation created by China’s own assertive actions, dramatic coverage of
Vietnam’s responses, and the semiofficial nationalist commentariat’s sensationalization
of the implications. One author who watched the progression of these events from inside
the state propaganda system has observed strong links between elevated expectations
for conflict and the explosion of nationalist postings on online platforms. According
to Liao Lei, after the PLAN’s South Sea Fleet conducted a series of live-fire exercises
around Hainan Island in mid-June, “some netizens linked this with Vietnam’s aggressive
posture on the South China Sea issue, believing these exercises to be China ‘preparing
for war,’ and statements related to ‘China and Vietnam cannot avoid a war’ filled online
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forums.”200 Once again, public attention and nationalist mobilization levels were not
rising in the lead-up to the incidents in question; rather, they increased afterward in
response.
The observation that the wave of popular mobilization on the South China Sea issue
arose after the incidents, not before, also rules out the elite-contention model of popular
nationalism as a driver of the gray-zone activities. A quantitative study of PRC censorship behavior during this period detected a decline in online comment deletions during
the wave of nationalist mobilization.201 Speculatively, it is possible that particular hawkish elites may have been behind this puzzling relaxation of censorship at this sensitive
time. But if so their efforts were obviously unsuccessful, as the PRC was decidedly more
restrained in its maritime behavior during the second half of 2011.202 A more likely
explanation, in line with the instrumental model of nationalism’s role in foreign policy, is
that the buzz of popular nationalism online formed a useful backdrop to the diplomatic
negotiations with Vietnam that were going on at the time.
Explanations. The MFA’s comments on this series of incidents clearly indicate that
China’s coercive law-enforcement actions were designed to oppose directly the Philippines’ and Vietnam’s energy-survey activities. When asked on 8 March about the Philippines’ diplomatic protest over the Reed Bank incident, MFA spokesperson Jiang Yu did
not address the issue directly, but reiterated China’s advocacy of joint development of
the disputed area’s resources. She repeated this when asked about unspecified other 纠纷
(entanglements) with Vietnam. Jiang also began the MFA’s 28 May response to the Binh
Minh 02 incident by stating, “China opposes Vietnam’s oil and gas exploration activities
within the waters under the jurisdiction of China.”203 Likewise, in the official response to
the Viking II incident, MFA spokesperson Hong Lei twice described Vietnamese energy
explorations as “illegal.” Hong then made a point of proclaiming China’s maritime rights
and interests in the specific area where the incident had taken place: “It needs to be pointed out that Vietnam grossly infringed China’s sovereignty as well as maritime rights and
interests by exploring oil and gas illegally in the Wan’an Bank waters and chasing away
Chinese fishing boats.”204 Narrowing the focus to this specific energy-rich area implied
that ownership of, or at least access to, these resources was a key motivation behind
China’s assertive actions.
Rising commodity prices and Chinese import volumes preceded China’s assertive actions in the first half of 2011, which is consistent with the increasing material value of
the disputed possessions being an explanation for policy change.205 The three actions all
targeted rival claimants’ attempts to develop energy resources in the disputed area in collaboration with third countries, and followed closely after Vietnam and the Philippines
launched new seismic-survey projects.206 By demonstrating vividly the serious risks involved in engaging in these explorations without China’s cooperation, the actions served
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China’s established objective of deterring foreign commercial enterprises from ongoing
and future involvement in the disputed area.207 This supported the long-standing objective of seeking joint development of resources in maritime areas that the PRC claimed
but did not control.208
This series of confrontational actions also was related closely to the development of the
UNCLOS legal regime. Most, if not all, of the PRC government law-enforcement vessels
involved in the three incidents were products of the shipbuilding projects initiated in
1999 to enforce China’s UNCLOS-inspired EEZ law.209 Emblematically, Haijian 84, one
of the main units involved in the Binh Minh 02 incident, was the thirteenth and final
vessel produced under this project, having been commissioned only recently, in early
2011.
The Binh Minh 02 and Viking II incidents, and a similar case of cable cutting in late
2012, all took place within the nine-dash line but beyond the area to which the PRC
could hope to sustain a claim under UNCLOS as part of an EEZ generated by the Paracel
or Spratly Islands (figure 14). China’s actions were focused on marginal areas where the
convention’s emergence as the globally legitimate basis for maritime resource rights had
weakened its claim greatly.210 The Reed Bank incident took place within an area where
the Philippines’ presence already was strong relative to China’s, owing to geographical proximity, previous survey activities, and third-country support. This suggests that
China’s increased maritime constabulary capabilities, developed to enforce its claims in
the UNCLOS era, coupled with its desire to 维持争议 (maintain the dispute) in areas
where its already weak claims were being subjected to new challenges, precipitated the
events of 2011.211
Some Vietnamese observers have interpreted this series of incidents as a test of their
country’s resolve. As one official described it, “It’s like someone puts one foot in your
house, if you don’t say anything, they will come inside.”212 The fact that the incidents
ceased after Vietnam’s furious reaction is certainly consistent with such a reading; only
one similar incident has been reported since that time, in late 2012.
The strategic probing explanation is compatible with the balance of power and the
material value of disputed possessions being driving factors behind a given instance of
assertiveness. Increased relative material capabilities and other positive changes in the
balance of power can create an incentive for a state to engage in assertive actions, as doing so allows it to update its assessment of adversaries’ resolve levels in light of the power
shift. Information yielded about opponents’ on-water capabilities and tactics also may
facilitate future attempts to access resources.
Strategic probing, however, is distinct from weakening claim strength as an impetus for
assertive actions. The former involves a state actively seeking updated information, the
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Figure 14. Location of incidents of Chinese vessels’ harassment of Vietnamese and Philippine
energy-survey ships, 2011–12.

Sources: Compiled using Google Earth, incident coordinates in official materials, and Gregory
B. Poling, The South China Sea in Focus: Clarifying the Limits of Maritime Dispute (Washington,
DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies; Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013).

better to inform future courses of action, while in the latter the state seeks to preserve
fading present hopes of achieving an existing objective. Although a probing interpretation cannot be discounted, there is stronger empirical support for the explanation outlined above: that the PRC’s coercive acts were the responses of a more powerful China to
new challenges to already weak claims to increasingly valuable resources.
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Some sources have linked these incidents to the CMS and Fisheries Administration
organizations’ bureaucratic interests in presenting themselves as tough defenders of the
nation’s sovereign claims.213 But unlike in the Sino-Indonesian fisheries clashes (case
study 3), there are good reasons to doubt that this was an important factor. First, risky
and confrontational coercive operations were not part of the CMS force’s range of normal responsibilities, but instead were carried out on an ad hoc basis under orders from
the command headquarters on the mainland.214 This means that the Reed Bank and Binh
Minh 02 actions are unlikely to have been initiatives of frontline units. At a minimum,
military authorities likely would have been informed, since the PLAN is tasked with
providing the security guarantee for civilian maritime law-enforcement operations.215
There was, in turn, little sign of civil-military disagreement over this aspect of policy,
with commentaries in the military’s official newspaper strongly affirming the MFA’s
official rhetoric emphasizing China’s peaceful intentions.216 The MFA’s prompt response
further suggests relatively strong coordination among agencies in Beijing, including
those presumed to hold relatively “dovish” policy preferences. The fact that spokesperson
Jiang Yu was able to make a swift response to the Binh Minh 02 incident on a weekend is
another suggestion of high-level coordination.
Finally, the repetitive occurrence of the incidents suggests that the actions at least did
not contradict the intent of the party center, since the initial incidents gave Beijing’s
decision makers an opportunity to clarify their instructions to maritime agencies if such
actions were contrary to their wishes. It is possible that the Viking II cable cutting was
indeed an accident, but if so it was one that occurred during a sustained, state-sponsored
harassment operation against Vietnam’s hydrocarbon-survey operations in the Vanguard
Bank.217
Conclusion. There were strong strategic and policy-based rationales for China’s assertive actions in the first half of 2011. Beijing wanted to deter its rivals from unilaterally
exploiting the increasingly valuable resources in the area in question and to reassert its
presence where its claims had been weakened—and it had the means to do so, in its new
fleet of white-hulled ships.
PRC domestic discourse indicates that nationalist public opinion was not plausibly a
significant contributor to China’s gray-zone actions in the first half of 2011. Official
statements made no attempt to claim credit for the incidents, instead casting China as
the victim and emphasizing conciliatory policies. The most influential state-controlled
mass media outlet, CCTV, made no prominent reports on the incidents, indicating the
state had little desire to use the assertive actions to bolster nationalist legitimacy, even after they already had occurred. And the wave of public attention that swelled during this
period arose after the incidents had taken place, not before, suggesting that Beijing may
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have used public opinion instrumentally in the diplomatic negotiations that followed the
incidents. In sum, popular nationalism neither drove the CCP state’s gray-zone coercion
early in the year nor constrained it from moderating its approach and pursuing warmer
ties with the Philippines and Vietnam during the second half of the year.
Nine months later, this period of moderation came to a close with the Scarborough
Shoal incident, examined next. This case would reveal even stronger evidence of Chinese
public opinion’s role in Beijing’s coercive diplomacy.
Case Study 6. Scarborough Shoal, 2012:
Cumulative Criticism and Strategic Channeling
On the morning of 10 April 2012, the Philippines’ naval ship BRP Gregorio del Pilar (FF
15) arrived at Scarborough Shoal, an isolated atoll around 125 nm off the northern coast
of Luzon, to investigate a group of Chinese fishing boats that an aerial patrol had spotted
two days earlier. After anchoring outside the entrance to the shallow midocean lagoon,
the warship dispatched armed soldiers on dinghies for a visit, board, search, and seizure
operation against the eight fishing vessels. This turned up large quantities of endangered
giant clams and corals, as shown in pictures released by the Philippines’ military.218
After collecting this photographic evidence, the Philippine soldiers returned to their
ship, apparently with the intention of detaining and processing the crews the following
day. However, late in the afternoon two CMS patrol boats arrived and took up positions
between Gregorio del Pilar and the fishing boats, physically preventing their arrest.219
Thus began a two-month standoff at sea that ended when the Philippines withdrew its
ships ahead of a typhoon, leaving China in control of the disputed atoll.220 Thereafter,
Manila refrained from sending its ships back to Scarborough Shoal, while Chinese
vessels maintained a constant presence. China emerged with effective control over the
shoal.221
Two aspects of China’s behavior during the Scarborough crisis manifested assertive
change in PRC policy in the gray zone of maritime conflict beneath the threshold of
war. First was the decision to intervene physically to oppose the arrest of the fishing
crews, creating the standoff in April.222 The second was China’s imposition of administrative control over Scarborough Shoal. According to Philippine records, PRC lawenforcement ships began increasing the number of law-enforcement and fishing boats
at the shoal and using coercive tactics to exclude Philippine boats from the area starting
in early May.223 This was accompanied by informal economic sanctions: “quarantining”
shipments of Philippine bananas and suspending tourism booked through PRC staterun travel agencies, which have a near monopoly on the Chinese outbound tourism
market.224 The ongoing enforcement of policies established at this time has involved
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subsequent coercive actions, including the use of water cannon against Philippine vessels
approaching the shoal.
The standoff between the Philippines and China over Scarborough Shoal in April–May
2012 was a stern test of the CCP’s ability to maintain control of popular nationalism. In
light of the highly visible wave of nationalist expression that coincided with these events,
many academic commentators have argued that popular nationalism was a key cause of
China’s assertiveness.225 Fu Ying, a senior foreign affairs official, and Wu Shicun, a wellplaced former Hainan provincial official, explain China’s actions as a response to public
outrage generated by photographs of the incident.226
However, while China’s leaders surely gave consideration to the public mood, the
strength of other explanations leaves the likely bottom-up impact on Beijing’s actual behavior as, at most, marginal. Moreover, tracing the domestic discourse reveals evidence
that authorities deliberately channeled popular nationalist sentiments toward the issue to
help deter Manila from opposing the new status quo at the shoal.
Official Comments and State Media. The voice of the party-state was ever present
throughout the Scarborough Shoal standoff and it dominated domestic Chinese media
coverage. The foreign ministry’s official transcripts show that MFA spokespersons commented on the issue in twenty-nine consecutive press conferences from 11 April to 28
May and in four separate ad hoc statements.
Spokesperson Liu Weimin addressed the situation in the MFA’s 11 April news conference, the first since the standoff began, answering a question from a state media reporter
about whether China had made diplomatic representations over the Philippines’
“so-called law enforcement” at Scarborough Shoal. Liu confirmed this, and added that
“China’s relevant departments have already dispatched government vessels to Huangyan
Island waters, and the Chinese fisherfolk and fishing boats are safe.”
This prompted a flurry of state media reporting, led by CCTV, which covered the issue
in national news bulletins on four out of eight nights between 11 and 18 April—a strong
sign of the central authorities’ intention to have domestic audiences follow developments.227 Three editorials in the Huanqiu Shibao raised the prospect of military conflict
over the issue between 12 and 24 April. Thus, the party-state promptly took the credit
for its assertive actions, so a nationalist legitimacy ploy is plausible as a consideration in
the state’s decision-making.
After the initial series of tough statements, the tone and content of China’s official comments moderated as diplomatic negotiations proceeded. From 19 April onward, the
MFA stopped explicitly demanding that the Philippines withdraw its ships, declared the
situation to be “easing,” emphasized a diplomatic resolution, and focused on rebutting
the Philippines’ attempts to define the standoff as an international problem.
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The PLA also made its first public comments, scrupulously dispelling any hint that
it might be pushing to take action of its own volition. Defense minister and Central
Military Commission member Gen. Liang Guanglie stated on 24 April, “At present we
have the diplomatic departments and relevant maritime departments dealing with this
issue, and I believe they will do a good job.”228 Ministry of Defense spokesperson Geng
Yansheng repeated this sentiment during the PLA’s monthly press conference on 26 April
and affirmed that the Chinese navy would “closely cooperate with departments such as
Fisheries and CMS to jointly safeguard the state’s maritime rights and interests.”229 PLAN
deputy chief of staff Li Shihong affirmed on 30 April that the navy would act only on the
basis of the Central Military Commission’s instructions.230
In short, while they informed the public of the assertive actions the state was taking,
party and military officials—singing from the same sheet of music—kept their rhetoric
restrained through the remainder of April.
Beijing’s diplomacy over Scarborough Shoal appeared to shift to a holding pattern ahead
of the Philippines-U.S. 2+2 meeting on 30 April, which promised vital insights into
Washington’s position. Still, authorities did not order the media to downplay the issue.
In fact, information control appears to have been lax around this time, with central state
media outlets carrying misleading reports that resulted in highly unfavorable coverage of
the party-state’s policy.
For example, on 23 April central state newswires reported information supplied by the
PRC embassy in Manila stating that Yuzheng 310—the Fisheries Administration flagship,
which had arrived on the scene with major media fanfare four days earlier—had “left
Huangyan Island,” along with CMS’s Haijian 84, leaving only one Chinese government
vessel there. Embassy spokesperson Zhang Hua was quoted saying that this was a demonstration of China’s willingness to negotiate diplomatically.231 This story was repudiated
the following day—in fact, both ships remained within 12 nm of the shoal—but not
before PRC commercial online news sites had presented it as a backing down in the face
of Philippine aggression.232
The most likely explanation for this combination of misleading official information,
loose state media reporting, and unchecked sensationalist impulses is that the authorities
in Beijing were preoccupied with internal matters, perhaps related to the Bo Xilai scandal unfolding at the time.233 After this short period of relative chaos, state media reporting tightened up from late April onward, with relatively low-key remarks from MFA and
Ministry of Defense press conferences dominating mass media and online coverage for
the next ten days. There also were no Huanqiu editorials or People’s Daily commentaries
on the subject between 26 April and 7 May.
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After that, however, a state-led media frenzy surged forth. On 8 May, as Philippine activist groups called for protests outside Chinese embassies around the world, the PRC’s official rhetoric hardened dramatically. The MFA posted a summary of a meeting between
Vice–Foreign Minister Fu Ying and Philippine diplomats, stating that Fu had warned
that “the Philippine side has obviously not realized the serious mistakes it is making.”
Most ominously, the MFA account cited Fu as stating that China “has made every kind
of preparation to respond to further enlargement of the situation.”234 MFA spokespersons
on 9 May and 10 May repeated Fu’s language of “serious mistakes,” reiterating that the
Philippine government was inciting anti-China protests, and warning of “strong reactions and concerns among Chinese people at home and abroad.”
This set off a tsunami of domestic media attention. A headline in the People’s Daily on
9 May read, “Philippines’ Actions Can Only Reduce ‘Likelihood of Peaceful Solution.’”
This was one of four Scarborough-related pieces on page 3 of the party mouthpiece.
The Huanqiu Shibao’s editorial the same day made the same point, with characteristic
bombast: “Peace Will Be a Miracle If Provocation Lasts.” CCTV’s 10 pm news bulletin,
meanwhile, informed the Chinese public that the events had provoked their “intense
reaction and attention” (figure 15).
This was certainly true. However, the data examined in the next section indicate that,
rather than public opinion driving the gray-zone policy on the water, the party-state
channeled the public’s nationalist sentiments toward the issue in support of its efforts to
force the Philippines to accept the new status quo around the shoal.
Public Attention and Mobilization. The decision to intervene in the Philippines’ attempted arrest of the fishermen at Scarborough Shoal in April was not a response to public
demand. First, demand for information on the South China Sea issue had declined
significantly since mid-2011 (see figure 16).235 This suggests that the level of public scrutiny on the state’s policy choices was probably lower than it had been in October 2011,
when China had handled at least one comparable fisheries incident in the Spratly Islands
Figure 15. CCTV coverage of Scarborough Shoal, 9 May 2012. The voice-over accompanying
the shot on the left is stating that the Philippines’ behavior“has caused an intense reaction and
attention among the Chinese masses at home and abroad.” On the right, military commentators
are discussing the Philippines’ “acts of violence,” suggesting China respond in kind.
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through diplomacy rather than on-water confrontation, despite heavy media reporting
and online nationalist criticism.236
Second, Beijing’s similarly low-key handling of the arrest of a Chinese fishing crew in the
Spratlys in May 2014 and their subsequent conviction in a Philippine court on poaching
charges demonstrated that nonconfrontational responses to this type of incident remained possible for Beijing despite the rise of nationalist public sentiments on the South
China Sea issue. Lower leadership tensions in 2014 and the hard-line persona that Xi
Jinping had cultivated by that time may have lowered the domestic costs of such an approach compared with 2012’s. But it nonetheless demonstrated that the rise of Internetenabled popular nationalism on the South China Sea issue had not been sufficient to
constrain the state from handling PRC-Philippines South China Sea fishing incidents in
a low-key manner. This is solid evidence against direct concern about nationalist public
opinion as a motivation for Beijing to engage in the Scarborough Shoal standoff.
If public opinion did play a role in the initial phase of the standoff in April, it more likely
was related to the elite political contestation going on at the time, involving the downfall
of Bo Xilai and the selection of a new leadership. Alignments between intraelite political
or policy groupings and the ongoing buzz of nationalist criticism could have contributed
to China’s decision to engage the Philippines in the standoff, in line with the elitecontention models of public opinion’s influence. An SOA publicity campaign earlier in
the year and the hawkish rhetoric of PLA propagandist Luo Yuan in early 2012 could be
interpreted as hints of this type of policy contention.237 There were also, as noted above,
signs of inconsistency in the media coverage of the issue in mid-to-late April.238
The problem with such an interpretation, however, is that there is little reason to believe
that any elite groups would have preferred a response more moderate than the one
Beijing pursued. On the contrary, the MFA’s rapid and detailed public response to the
incident suggested either top-level coordination or a consensus on the matter. The most
plausible link would be that, in the tense overall political atmosphere prevailing at the
Figure 16. Quarterly average Baidu Search Index value for “South China Sea” (南海), 2006–15.
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time, sustained nationalist criticism of the CCP’s conciliatory policy toward the Philippines and Vietnam since mid-2011 had a cumulative political effect that rendered a
moderate response untenable. Again, however, there are various strong rationales for
Beijing’s hard-line approach (discussed in detail below), so it is far from clear that the
relevant decision makers would have handled the issue differently in the absence of the
political tensions and online nationalist vitriol. More importantly, during the second
phase of the standoff in May, nationalist public opinion became a useful instrument with
which to ratchet up the pressure on Manila.
The public response to Vice–Foreign Minister Fu Ying’s ominous 7 May comments and
the associated intensification of state media coverage were many orders of magnitude
larger than those pertaining to the news of the incident itself. On 9 and 10 May, as the
MFA and central media repeatedly told audiences of their “intense reaction and attention,” the BSI for 黄岩岛 (Scarborough Shoal) jumped to around 160,000, quadruple
the highest value it had reached at the height of the agitation in April (figure 17). This
expansion of the attentive public brought with it a major broadening of public participation in online discourse. Scarborough Shoal became the leading topic on Sina Weibo, a
social media platform with a highly generalized mass user base, on which foreign affairs
issues rarely were prominent. The hashtag #ChineseWarshipsApproachPhilippinesTerritory propelled the Scarborough standoff to the top of the Weibo trending topics list—
assuredly subject to close monitoring by censors—for about twenty-four hours between
9 and 10 May.239 Subsequently, nationalist sentiments found expression in mass petitions,
hacking attacks, consumer boycotts, and even small street protests.240 The crucial detail,
however, is that this all began several days after the PRC had begun imposing administrative control at the shoal, which means that this wave of mobilization cannot help
explain the policy shift.241
During the media wave, two arms of the party-state responsible for foreign-directed
communications repeatedly drew attention to the escalatory pressure from China’s
citizens, suggesting that the media wave may have been intended as a warning. On 9
and 10 May, MFA spokesperson Hong Lei publicly repeated the message—verbatim, in
successive press conferences—that the Philippines had “triggered strong reaction and
concerns from the Chinese people.” English-language propaganda content elaborated on
the theme. Xinhua ran a full article on the public’s reaction and its implications, under
the headline “China Outraged by Philippines’ Provocation”; the article pointed out that
“China is completely free to tackle the Huangyan Island incident in a different way.”242
In its 9 May editorial, the English-language Global Times warned that, given the Chinese
public’s hard-line policy preferences, the international community “should not be completely surprised” if the confrontation “escalates into a military clash.”
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Figure 17. Baidu search activity on “Huangyan Island” (黄岩岛) (Scarborough Shoal), April–June
2012.
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By channeling popular sentiments toward the issue, Beijing likely hoped to sharpen Manila’s perception of the risk of serious escalation should it oppose the Chinese gains on
the water. Remarks from Philippine leaders both before and after the standoff do suggest
that Chinese popular nationalist discourse may have contributed to Manila’s decision
to accept the new status quo as a reality.243 Together with the strength of the alternative
rationales for China’s on-water policy shift discussed below, this leaves the instrumental
model as the strongest explanation for the role of Chinese popular nationalism in the
Scarborough Shoal standoff.
Explanations. The Scarborough standoff resulted from a confluence of circumstances,
some intended, some serendipitous. First of all, PRC fisheries authorities had been
“actively guiding” China’s fishing fleet to head to the atoll since at least 2008, increasing
the likelihood of interaction with Philippine authorities.244 The fishing boats at the shoal
in April 2012, at least two of which were skippered by squad leaders from the Tanmen
Maritime Militia, had traveled there with the aid of state subsidies.245 Confrontation followed the Philippine military’s decision to dispatch its largest naval vessel—a refurbished
U.S. Coast Guard cutter commissioned into the Philippine navy in December 2011—to
investigate the Chinese fishing activities first spotted by an airborne patrol on 8 April.
The next key link in the causal chain was the emergency distress call system that had
been installed recently on the PRC fishing boats. This enabled the crews to alert authorities in Hainan instantaneously of the situation using the Beidou satellite navigation
system that had entered service in December 2011.246 The Philippine naval personnel’s
decision to return to Gregorio del Pilar then created a narrow time window within which
PRC maritime law-enforcement authorities could arrive to prevent the arrests. Finally,
the ability of CMS ships Haijian 75 and Haijian 84 to accomplish this task was a direct
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result of their being in the area on a “regular rights-defense patrol” at the time.247 This
program of regular patrolling, introduced in 2007, had been strengthened in the Scarborough Shoal area in 2009 and 2011.248
Beneath this array of proximate causes, increased maritime administrative capabilities
were a major factor behind the change in China’s behavior. Beijing’s responses to this
type of situation probably had not been tested since 2006, the last time Manila arrested
Chinese fishermen there.249 The PRC’s level of activity around the shoal had been increasing since around 2007. There was increased patrolling and fishing activity in 2008,
2009, and 2011; stronger public statements about the feature by MFA spokespersons;
and even a newly supportive attitude toward Chinese ham-radio enthusiasts broadcasting from the feature.250 Once again, new maritime constabulary capabilities developed
in response to the UNCLOS regime from the 1990s onward also were necessary for the
change in the PRC’s behavior to occur. The large, fast patrol boats that arrived in time to
rescue the fishing crews were both recent additions to the CMS fleet.251 These ships were
vital to the “regular rights-defense patrol” program that resulted in their being located
close enough to the scene to intervene in the incident in April. And with Sino-Japanese
tensions rising in the East China Sea, far to the north, the new high-endurance maritime
law-enforcement ships were surely crucial to the subsequent lockdown of Scarborough
Shoal from May onward, which required their constant presence.252 The crucial role of
the newly operational Beidou satellite system, with its unique Short Message Service
(known as SMS) text message–transmission function, showed further how improved
technological capabilities augment a state’s ability to administer disputed maritime
spaces. With the development of these specific capabilities, it is not surprising that CCP
policy makers’ attitude toward the issue changed between 2006 and 2012.253
There is evidence to suggest the importance of three other factors in particular. Declining coastal fish stocks may have increased the value of Scarborough Shoal’s marine life,
and Chinese fishing activities do appear to have increased after the PRC took control,
suggesting that this may have provided part of the motivation for Beijing’s hardening
position.254 And the initial decision to divert the CMS ships to initiate the standoff in
April could have been taken by SOA chief Liu Cigui and his colleagues as an opportunity
to pursue institutional or personal political gain, although the MFA’s rapid and detailed
response examined above suggests otherwise.255 Finally, there is tenuous evidence suggesting that Xi Jinping may have been involved in handling China’s response to the Scarborough Shoal crisis, although the opacity of CCP decision-making makes it difficult to
rule this either in or out.256
However, several of these explanations can be ruled out for the May escalation. Substate
politics is unlikely to account for the lockdown of the shoal, as it involved coordination among a wide range of state agencies.257 It is equally difficult to characterize the
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Scarborough Shoal incident as a case of China attempting to save a rapidly weakening
claim, although it is possible that the strengthening of the U.S.-Philippines alliance
under President Aquino increased Beijing’s sensitivity to demonstrations of Manila’s
control. It was not a strategic probe, as the PRC stood firm when its actions encountered
resistance from the Philippines.258 But the factors outlined above—especially China’s
burgeoning maritime administrative capabilities—appear sufficient to explain the
change in the PRC’s policy over Scarborough Shoal since 2006.
Conclusion. Before the standoff at Scarborough Shoal began, the PRC’s policy for
handling fisheries incidents there had not been tested since 2006. Improvement in its
material capabilities since that time directly enabled China’s actions. Increased economic
might, technological infrastructure, and maritime law-enforcement capabilities designed
to meet the UNCLOS era were important permissive factors for Beijing to opt for the
observed course of gray-zone action. Furthermore, the shoal’s aquatic resources had
increased in value owing to declining coastal fish stocks. The decision to confront the
Philippines and commence the April standoff may have involved an element of policy
entrepreneurship from ambitious SOA party chief Liu Cigui (with support from the
PLAN) or it may have reflected Xi Jinping’s personal leadership style, but there is little
reason to believe that any relevant policy players thought it should have been handled
differently.
The strength of these explanations leaves very limited room for the possibility of
bottom-up popular nationalist influence. Given the elevated elite tensions at the time,
public opinion might have tipped the balance in favor of confrontation, but only if we
assume that influential policy actors were deterred from advocating a nonconfrontational response to the situation.
A month into the standoff, China ramped up its vessel numbers at the shoal and began
denying access to Philippine ships. At this point, heightened MFA rhetoric and saturation media coverage prompted a major surge in attention across Chinese society, from
which flowed an outpouring of popular nationalist expression that Beijing evidently was
keen for the outside world to notice. Scarborough Shoal thus introduced a new role for
the PRC’s networked “masses” in the South China Sea dispute: not as a driver of irrational assertiveness, but as a resource in the pursuit of the simultaneous “rights defense and
stability maintenance” that expresses the PRC’s gray-zone policy in maritime disputes.
Case Study 7. The Diaoyu Nationalization, 2012: A Nationalist Feedback Loop?
During the second half of 2012, tensions over the Diaoyu Islands erupted. This led to the
most serious deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations since normalization in 1972.
The issue began to heat up in April 2012, when the right-wing governor of Tokyo,
Shintaro Ishihara, announced a plan for the municipal government to purchase three of
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the disputed islands from their private owner. After simmering for several months, the
crisis came to a head in August and September 2012, when Japan’s national government
stepped in to purchase the islands.
Immediately after Japan went ahead with the purchase, the PRC formally promulgated
territorial sea baselines around the disputed islands. Four days later, China launched a
program of regular patrols in the newly declared 12 nm zone, using CMS and Fisheries
Administration ships. This challenged forty years of Japanese on-water administrative
control of the waters around the islands, imposing a situation of overlapping control.259
Nationalist mobilizations, uncertainty over the fate of Bo Xilai, and the looming Eighteenth CCP Congress raise the possibility that nationalist public opinion may have been
a factor in China’s behavior.260 Peter Hays Gries, Derek Steiger, and Tao Wang argue that
the party-state was afraid to suppress the anti-Japan sentiments, because of the effect this
might have had on its legitimacy, and that this contributed to its assertive actions. Weiss
argues that while street protests originally were permitted to send a signal of resolve, the
assertive policies on the water were aimed in part to “defuse hawkish pressures.” Reilly,
on the other hand, finds that the state tolerated the wave of mobilization to release the
public’s anger and build legitimacy, but also to “enhance diplomatic leverage.”261 Would
China have acted differently if the public had not been so angry and attentive? Or did
the elevated level of public agitation itself follow the state’s hard-line stance?
Evidence suggests that Beijing deliberately focused public attention toward the issue in
August in the hope of deterring Tokyo from proceeding with purchase of the islands.
When this failed and the Noda administration proceeded with the purchase, it left
the CCP party-state to respond to public humiliation, by a historical adversary, amid
heightened public scrutiny and severe internal tensions within the party. Thus, if the
state instrumentalized popular nationalism in its deterrence signaling in August, this
appears to have fed back into China’s hard-line response in September. Given the high
levels of public attention and agitation, at least some aspects of China’s response to the
island purchase in 2012 were aimed at easing popular (and elite) nationalist pressure.
These included the submission of China’s territorial sea baselines to the United Nations
in New York on 14 September, cancelation of events to celebrate the fortieth anniversary
of the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, and China’s nonattendance at a World
Bank meeting in Tokyo. It is likely that Beijing’s policy makers would have preferred not
to take these courses of action and would have refrained had public opinion not been so
agitated.
However, the same cannot be said about the regular patrols around Diaoyu, which officials had touted as a desirable outcome several months earlier. Compelling alternative
rationales exist for this key on-water component of China’s response to the Diaoyu crisis.
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It also was implemented just as an even larger surge of state-led popular nationalist
sentiment burst forth in September, helping avoid the possibility of Japanese opposition
to the new gray-zone policy. The details of this case point to a complex series of statesociety interactions in which popular nationalist expression was by turns a cause, effect,
and component part of China’s on-water policy shift.
Official Comments and State Media. On 15 August, a group of Hong Kong–based
baodiao (protect Diaoyu) activists landed on the disputed islands. The impetus for the
trip was reports of a plan by right-wing Japanese politicians to visit the islands on 19
August.262 Baodiao voyages are prevented routinely by Hong Kong authorities or intercepted by mainland maritime law enforcement.
On this occasion, however, not only did PRC authorities refrain from blocking the activists’ voyage, but central media covered the activists’ progress live, sending out dramatic
blow-by-blow accounts to audiences across China, including the activists’ landing and
their inevitable arrest by Japanese authorities.263 Soon afterward, senior MFA official
Vice–Foreign Minister Fu Ying publicly demanded the “immediate and unconditional
release” of the activists.264 Even after the activists’ repatriation to Hong Kong on 17 August, the MFA maintained the harsh rhetoric, labeling their detention “a gross violation
of China’s territorial sovereignty.”265
After Japan followed through with the island deal on 10 September, a wide array of PRC
party-state organs issued a torrent of vitriolic comments. The official line was defined by
a formal foreign ministry statement denouncing the purchase as another “gross violation
of China’s sovereignty” and demanding that Japan “should return to the track of negotiated settlement” or it would “bear all serious consequences arising therefrom.” From the
very beginning, externally directed comments repeatedly drew foreign attention to the
rising nationalist sentiments in China. MFA spokesman Hong Lei declared in his
11 September press conference that Japan’s “wrong actions” had “aroused the indignation of the Chinese people at home and abroad.” English-language propaganda from
Xinhua even announced, “Anger is also smoldering among the general public in China,
with anti-Japanese demonstrations taking place Tuesday.”266
In China’s domestic media, indignant reports on the issue ran on high rotation on central state broadcast media throughout the next four days. China’s most authoritative and
influential TV news program, the 7 pm Network News bulletin, ran lengthy features on
the issue every evening throughout the week. On Friday, 14 September, hours before the
largest protests exploded, the Diaoyu situation was reported even ahead of the activities
of party leaders.267 Not only did this highly unusual occurrence imply that, contra the
elite-contention model, the top leadership was involved in handling the crisis; it also
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signaled to domestic audiences that an extraordinary situation existed in which normal
rules—such as a prohibition on collective demonstrations—might not apply.
When CMS ships made their first foray into the 12 nm territorial waters on 14 September, state news agencies almost immediately pushed out powerful imagery from the
scene (figure 18). Officials and state media also repeatedly drew attention to the government’s resolute stance and assertive 一系列反制措施 (series of countermeasures). State
propaganda even claimed—quite misleadingly—that the Chinese patrol boats had 驱赶
(expelled) Japanese vessels near the islands. In fact, the “expulsion” process referred to
little more than shadowing the Japanese ships at a distance, with flashing electronic signs
demanding that they vacate the area, until they left of their own accord.268
Evidently, the party-state was keen to portray itself as striking a hard-line stance, but
this is consistent with both the legitimacy and instrumental models. And the evidence
presented below suggests that the party-state’s hard-line stance was itself a major reason
why the public was so agitated.
Figure 18. Images of CMS patrols within 12 nm of Diaoyu Islands, released on 14 September
2012.

Public Attention and Mobilization. Anti-Japan protests were held in some forty cities
on the weekend of 18–19 August. In addition to the abnormally intense and dramatic
state media coverage noted above, Christopher Cairns and Allen Carlson have detected
a relaxation of censorship on social media during the first peak in anti-Japan mobilization on the weekend of 18–19 August.269 At that point, the PRC was seeking to persuade
the Japanese government not to proceed with its planned purchase of five of the islands
from a debt-stricken private owner. But if Beijing was channeling popular nationalism
toward the issue to send a warning to Tokyo, it failed completely; the Noda administration proceeded with the purchase.270 This left the CCP party-state to respond to public
humiliation by an adversary toward whom historical grievances are especially strong,
amid heightened public scrutiny and severe internal tensions in the party.
Interest in the Diaoyu Islands issue among PRC Internet users—a large and growing
proportion of the population—peaked on 11 September, the same day Japan announced
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its decision to execute the ownership transfer (figure 19). Consistent with the legitimacy
models of nationalism as a driver of policy, this surge occurred three days before the
patrols inside the Diaoyu Islands 12 nm zone began. But if the heavy publicity of the
patrols confirmed that the CCP was keen to take credit for its resolute stance, this may
have been a by-product of the new regular patrolling patterns rather than a motivation.
As explained below, Beijing’s desire to claim patriotic points for its hard-line on-water
actions against Japan probably also was tempered, counterintuitively, by its concerns
about social stability.
Figure 19. Baidu search activity on “Diaoyu Islands” (钓鱼岛), May–October 2012. The box
highlights the value of the index for 11 September 2012.

The sequence of events makes clear that the violent mass protests in September did not
drive the assertive on-water actions; indeed, the reverse is more likely. Over the weekend of 15–16 September—after the heavy state-media publicity of these assertive new
measures noted above—the wave of nationalist sentiments exploded into massive and
sometimes violent street rallies. Beijing authorities facilitated, surveilled, and controlled
these protests by closing the road outside the Japanese embassy to traffic to create a
contained protest zone with a concentrated armed police presence and hundreds, if
not thousands, of volunteers assisting with “stability maintenance.”271 Intriguingly, by
18 September, the most sensitive date on the Chinese nationalist calendar, the Central
Propaganda Department was ordering media to downplay rousing narratives of China’s
retaliation against Japanese provocation.272 Several cases already discussed have shown
evidence of assertive policies stimulating nationalist activities. The party’s otherwise
puzzling behavior in refusing the credit for its hard-line response suggests that CCP authorities may have been aware that further publicity of assertive on-water moves might
fuel, rather than placate, the patriotic mobilizations. If so, this would decrease further
the likelihood that mollifying nationalist mobilization was among the motivations for
introducing the patrols.273
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The Chinese government ships began their new patterns of on-water actions in the
territorial seas on 14 September against a backdrop of large-scale anti-Japan demonstrations that continued until 19 September.274 The associated threat of further instability
and escalation loomed to help deter interference with the new policy. As geographers He
Xiaojing, Liu Yungang, and Ge Qiujing argue, Beijing used state media to “upscale” the
scope of involvement in the dispute to compensate for the materially superior capabilities of Japan and its U.S. ally.275 The wave of state-led popular nationalist mobilization
gave Japan strong incentives not to interfere with the new PRC on-water presence, lest
a spiral of escalation ensue. This time, unlike in August, the popular nationalist threat
signal worked, helping the PRC to achieve its stated policy goal of “unity of rights defense and stability maintenance” in the East China Sea. There was no need for the state
to hide its involvement; in fact, giving Japan (and the United States) some assurance that
the state was ultimately in control was essential to ensuring a deterrent effect. The case
appears to illustrate popular nationalism being channeled into a failed attempt at deterrence signaling in August, before feeding back as a bottom-up driver of assertiveness.
But these same public sentiments also may have helped to secure the PRC’s new and otherwise provocative on-water patrolling patterns. This suggests how, as Zhang Shiming
has surmised, nationalism simultaneously can act as a motivation and an opportunity
for foreign policy actions.276
Explanations. As noted in case study 4, for several years before 2012 China’s approach
to the Diaoyu Islands issue had been toughening, especially in the gray zone of maritime law enforcement. Japanese government statistics record PRC patrol boats entering
the Diaoyu 12 nm zone for the first time in late 2008, but tellingly they had made three
entries in the year leading up to the 2012 crisis.277 The September 2010 Sino-Japanese
confrontation over legal proceedings that Japan initiated against the captain of a Chinese
fishing boat that had rammed a JCG vessel may have been part of this trend, although
it is not entirely clear that China would have reacted more mildly had this occurred in
the past.278 While the captain’s reckless seamanship probably was not state directed, the
incident occurred during intensified state-sponsored PRC fishing in the area.279 China’s
institution of regular patrols around the Diaoyu Islands in September 2012 was consistent with this general trend of increasing assertiveness in the East China Sea since 2006.
In fact, central media had touted the possibility of patrolling regularly around Diaoyu to
break Japan’s 实际控制 (actual control) since as early as March 2012.280 As noted above,
Chinese patrols within 12 nm of the islands already were on the rise before the crisis—
and, in fact, PRC maritime officials had flagged the desirability of conducting regular
patrols within the islands’ territorial waters.281 The policy shift likely would have required significant preparation time. Geographical survey data also had to be assembled
to determine the precise location of the territorial sea baselines, and a wide range of state

64

china maritime studies

and military resources had to be organized to form the multiregional fleet that began
patrolling the area. This relatively long lead-in time should decrease our confidence that
the patrols were a reaction to the demands of popular nationalism.
As in many other cases examined here, China’s altered behavior would not have been
possible without the specific maritime law-enforcement capabilities developed in
response to the advent of the UNCLOS era in the late 1990s. In particular, the new
high-endurance patrol boats initiated in 2000 to equip the CMS fleet were crucial; this
is evident from the fact that even with these new ships the PRC still needed to call on
all three regional fleets, plus provincial patrol vessels, to sustain its regular presence in
the disputed waters from September onward.282 The PRC also believed that the legal
implications of the Japanese government’s purchase of the islands were a potentially
severe challenge to the viability of its claim.283 Thus, it is likely that a sense of weakening
claim strength combined with China’s increasing maritime administrative capabilities
developed in response to the UNCLOS era produced the change in policy that manifested itself in 2012. Fravel’s theory of state behavior in territorial disputes holds that
escalation is more likely when challenges to the viability of a state’s claim coincide with
other internal or external security threats.284
Coordination among many state agencies (from CMS and the PLA to the MFA and
Ministry of Commerce) was required to implement the on-water policy shift, so substate
vested interests are unlikely to have been a cause of the policy shift. In fact, there were
strong signs of the top leadership’s involvement.285 The material value of the disputed
possessions had not increased in any obvious way. As in the Scarborough Shoal case
(case study 6), the assertive gray-zone policy might have reflected the preferences of
either Hu Jintao or Xi Jinping, but, given the trajectory of China’s maritime policy under
Hu, it is far from clear the two would have differed from each other. Indeed, there is little
indication of any other leaders favoring a softer response. Of course, this apparent hawkish consensus itself may have resulted from nationalist public opinion. But this public
opinion and the resultant pressure to act assertively, in turn, were largely attributable to
leading central state media coverage.
Conclusion. Given the high levels of public attention and agitation as well as elite
political tensions, it is likely that at least some aspects of China’s response to the island
purchase in 2012, such as canceling diplomatic engagements, were aimed at answering
the expectations of nationalist public opinion. Beijing’s policy makers likely would have
preferred not to take the courses of action they did, such as the canceling of diplomatic
engagements and negotiations, and would have refrained had public opinion been less
agitated. But the same cannot be said about the regular patrols around Diaoyu, for which
alternative rationales were strong, and which officials even had touted several months
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prior as a desirable outcome. Therefore, even in this most likely case, it is unlikely that
nationalist public opinion influenced China’s on-water conduct significantly.
But even if no direct bottom-up causal links existed between public opinion and the new
PRC patterns of patrolling around the Diaoyu Islands, the Chinese public’s displays of
nationalist sentiments may have helped secure this gray-zone policy initiative by deterring possible opposition from the Japan Coast Guard. Considering the PRC’s official
comments, saturation coverage in the state media, otherwise curious absences of censorship, and externally directed comments alluding to nationalist sentiments, it appears that
the party-state decided that the public’s anger over the Diaoyu issue was best treated as a
diplomatic resource. Beijing’s apparent attempt in August to leverage popular nationalism to send a warning to Tokyo not to purchase the islands failed entirely. As noted, this
left the CCP party-state to respond to public humiliation by an adversary toward whom
historical grievances are especially strong, amid heightened public scrutiny and severe
internal tensions in the party. But in September, when the party-state hit back with its
new program of patrols, the massive accompanying outpouring of popular nationalism created good reasons for Japan—and perhaps its allies and partners—to respond
cautiously, thereby helping China secure a new status quo in the East China Sea’s most
contentious waters.
Case Study 8. Second Thomas Shoal, 2013–14: Public Opinion Windfall
Another China-Philippines standoff—of lower intensity, but more prolonged, than the
one at Scarborough Shoal—began in May 2013 at 仁爱礁 (Second Thomas Shoal).
This submerged atoll in the Spratly group has no legal territorial status, but has been
the subject of contention between the two countries since 1999, when the Philippines
grounded the BRP Sierra Madre, an aging navy ship, on the reef. Manila claimed at the
time that this was accidental, but Sierra Madre has been home to a small detachment of
marines ever since, despite the rapid disintegration of the rusting hulk.
Second Thomas Shoal (sometimes referred to simply as Second Thomas) sits just over
the horizon from the PRC’s outpost at Mischief Reef, but the PRC is not known to have
threatened the Philippine presence there until early May 2013, when CCG ships suddenly began lingering continuously nearby in plain sight. Over the following eighteen
months, these ships intercepted and harassed several Philippine supply missions,
manifesting a new willingness on the PRC’s behalf to use coercive tactics to put pressure
on the Philippine presence at the shoal.286 How should we explain this new gray-zone
policy?
Official Comments and State Media. From the earliest stages of the Second Thomas
episode, the official comments by the Chinese government clearly acknowledged that its
patrolling actions were assertive; official spokespersons also repeatedly described them
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as “irreproachable.”287 In the second altercation, around nine months later, China directly
initiated publicity of its actions, with the MFA announcing on 10 March 2014, that the
CCG had succeeded in warding off two intruding Philippine supply ships loaded with
construction materials.288 The possibility of a legitimacy-based motivation for the policy
shift therefore passes the first test of plausibility: the public was informed and the state
took credit. But further examination of the official comments, online media coverage,
and the public’s attention levels undercuts this idea.
First, it was commercial media, rather than central state organs, that promoted the narrative that China had acted assertively, especially during the all-important initial phase
when the issue first became public, around 10 May 2013. The MFA confirmed that
Chinese ships had taken “normal routine law enforcement” actions at Second Thomas
Shoal, but the idea that these actions were anything out of the ordinary emerged mainly
in the commercial media treatment of the issue. The public first heard about the events
at Second Thomas Shoal in a 10 May 2013, Xinhua translation of Philippine media
reports. Commercial online news providers jumped at the chance to sensationalize,
suggesting PLA action; “Chinese Destroyers Enter SCS Second Thomas Shoal Waters,
PHL Military Sends 3 Ships to Monitor” was the most popular headline on China’s commercial news portals. In stark contrast, Xinhua’s own headline had made no suggestion
of any PRC action at all: “PHL Reports Claim PHL Navy Dispatches 3 Warships to Ren’ai
Reef in Spratlys.”289 The fact that it was left to commercial media to infer an assertive
shift in this way reduces the likelihood that a desire to impress public opinion motivated
the state’s actions.
Second, numerous official statements actively downplayed the assertiveness of the
Chinese ships’ conduct; at one point, the MFA even provided information on the Philippines’ success in resupplying its outpost. In its 30 May press conference, for example,
the Defense Ministry’s spokesman Geng Yansheng emphatically denied that China was
cutting off food and water to the Philippines’ outpost. In June, PRC spokespersons from
both the diplomatic and military corps also repeatedly fielded questions about Philippine defense secretary Voltaire Gazmin’s remarks that China had allowed a resupply and
rotation mission to pass through to the Philippine outpost. Asked on 24 June about this
apparent Philippine logistical success, the MFA spokesperson declared that China never
would accept the 非法侵占 (illegal occupation) of Chinese territory, including Second
Thomas Shoal, but added that the Philippines’ crumbling outpost on that “indisputable”
Chinese sovereign territory actually did not constitute such an occupation. This intricate
mental gymnastics routine seems unlikely to have been designed with indignant patriots
in mind. If China had instituted an assertive new policy in part to impress public opinion, it would make very little sense to walk back from that policy publicly just a couple
of weeks later. The public treatment of the Philippines’ eventual success in resupplying
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and reinforcing its outpost at Second Thomas Shoal, then, is further evidence against
the idea that the initial blockade was aimed at domestic public opinion in China. If it
had been, we would expect the PRC to have either downplayed the issue or attempted to
counter the narrative of Philippine success.
Third, the lack of mention by central party media also should reduce confidence in
a legitimacy motivation lying behind the PRC’s gray-zone actions at Second Thomas
Shoal, as well as the instrumental model in which the state uses public opinion as a diplomatic resource. If concern about popular pressure or international strategic advantage
motivated the state, we would expect to find some sign of an attempt to make sure this
narrative reached domestic or international audiences. Contrary to the expectations of
the legitimacy model, the key central state TV news programs do not appear to have
mentioned Second Thomas Shoal until 30 May, and when they finally did the emphasis
was on the Philippines’ “serious violation of China’s territorial sovereignty” and featured
no information at all regarding the Chinese ships’ actions in response.290 Contrary to the
instrumental model, the PRC’s foreign-directed comments on the matter made no reference to public pressure. This constitutes strong evidence against the idea that nationalist public opinion was a significant driver of, or instrumental component in, Beijing’s
actions.
Public Attention. The PRC’s actions at Second Thomas Shoal were not preceded by any
groundswell of public or media attention toward this area of policy. Few of China’s citizens even would have known about the Philippine ship grounded on the reef; the name
仁爱礁 barely had rated a mention in China’s online media until the Chinese ships made
their move in May 2013.291 More generally, attention levels toward the South China Sea
had fallen back significantly since the heightened interest over the Sino-Vietnamese tensions in 2011 and the Scarborough Shoal standoff in 2012 (see figure 16 in case study 6).
Internet search activity for “South China Sea” was the lowest it had been for two years.
This offers little support for the idea that popular nationalist pressure contributed to the
policy shift.
There are few, if any, signs of substate contention contributing to this line of behavior,
and the BSI data contain further evidence against the elite-contention models of nationalist public opinion’s effect on policy. Activity on “Second Thomas Shoal” as a search
term indicates that the networked public’s demand for information on the matter spiked
on precisely the days when the foreign ministry made major statements on the matter:
10 May, 22 May, 30 May, and 21 June 2013, and 10 March and 30 March 2014.292 This
indicates that the central party-state’s official information releases largely determined the
issue’s salience on the online public’s agenda. In contrast to the Sino-Indonesian fisheries
issues (case study 3), when an assortment of provincial and commercial media reports
sourced to Fisheries Administration officials drove the public’s interest, substate actors
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do not appear to have attempted to use public opinion to pressure central decision makers into assertive moves at Second Thomas Shoal.
In the absence of nationalist public pressure and with no indication of any attempt to
draw on public opinion for diplomatic advantage, why did the PRC go public with the
situation at Second Thomas Shoal? The most likely explanation is that, having initiated
the CCG vigil at the shoal successfully, the party-state authorities sought to bank some
nationalist legitimacy points.
The context is instructive in this regard. On 9 May, one day after China began intensive
patrolling at Second Thomas in 2013, an incident occurred in which Philippine Coast
Guard personnel shot to death a Taiwan fisherman. The public outcry this generated in
China probably increased Beijing’s incentives to appear, at least, to get tough on Manila.
This may explain the MFA’s apparent desire to inform the public about the patrolling
Figure 20. Baidu search activity on 仁爱礁 (Second Thomas Reef), 2013, showing spikes after
MFA announcements on 10 May (A), 22 May (B), 30 May (C) and 21 June (D).

Figure 21. Baidu search activity on 仁爱礁 (Second Thomas Reef), 2014, showing spikes after
MFA announcements on 10 March (C) and 30 March (E).
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activities at Second Thomas from 10 May onward. If the MFA’s publicity indeed was
aimed at neutralizing nationalist criticism over the Taiwan fisherman’s death, it is possible the party-state was not even intending to inform the public of the Second Thomas
patrols had the death not occurred. That possibility further reduces the likelihood that
the patrolling actions themselves were intended to appeal to nationalist audiences.
Explanations. As with earlier cases, new maritime constabulary capabilities developed to
administer new UNCLOS-created jurisdictional entitlements directly enabled the PRC’s
new patterns of behavior. Maintaining the constant presence at the shoal would have
been impossible without the large, high-endurance patrol vessels developed after China
enacted its EEZ law in 1998. More specifically, these gray-zone behaviors at Second
Thomas Shoal probably became an option only with the arrival of the third wave of
modern surveillance cutters beginning in early 2013.293 In 2012, the PRC had drawn on
vessels from all three regional CMS and Fisheries Administration fleets, plus provincial law enforcement, to maintain its minimum monthly patrol presence in the Diaoyu
Islands area. This suggests that it would have lacked the ability to maintain a constant
presence at the shoal for months or years on end, if not for the new additions.
This explanation—resting on specific capabilities developed to meet the UNCLOS era—
needs to be distinguished from more-general balance-of-power arguments. In fact, there
are good reasons to doubt that the favorable changes in the regional military balance
actually enabled, let alone motivated, China’s policies around Second Thomas Shoal.
First, China had enjoyed naval dominance over the Philippines for decades, but not over
the Philippines’ ally the United States. The PLA’s increasing 反介入 (anti-intervention)
power-projection capabilities may have increased Beijing’s confidence about deterring or
defeating any possible U.S. military involvement, but this may not have made a difference to its choices in this case. Counterfactually, if the same set of events had occurred
in the 1990s, before China developed its asymmetric capabilities to inflict damage on the
U.S. Navy in the area, it is still highly unlikely that the United States would have become
involved militarily—this was clear from the lack of U.S. response to the PRC’s occupation of Mischief Reef in 1994–95. So, improved military power-projection capabilities
meaningfully contributed to the policy shift only to the extent that, without them, Beijing would have been concerned enough about U.S. intervention to refrain from using
coast guard ships in this way. China’s words and actions offer no sign of such concern.
The PRC’s escalatory action plausibly could be explained as an attempt to respond to
new challenges that weakened its position in the dispute, either in a general sense or
in the particular local area. Most obviously, the CCG’s vigil at the shoal began around
three months after the Philippines initiated arbitration proceedings under UNCLOS.
The threat that Beijing understood this legal case to pose to its claims in the area was
apparent, first of all, from Beijing’s bellicose objections and desperate attempts to evade,
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delay, and ultimately discredit the process. Three years later, Beijing’s anxiety about
the arbitration was revealed as justified when the tribunal handed down a judgment
explicitly denying China any resource rights based on the nine-dash line, affirming that
submerged reefs such as Mischief Reef cannot be appropriated as sovereign territory, and
greatly reducing the area of the South China Sea over which China could claim jurisdiction under UNCLOS. The initial submission of the Philippines did not raise the issue of
Second Thomas Shoal specifically, but China’s actions there may have been one aspect of
its comprehensive attempt to pressure the Philippines into dropping the case.
Beijing also may have understood its harassment of the Philippine supply ships as an
attempt to forestall the possibility of a permanent “loss” of the reef. The MFA repeatedly
stated that China’s principal objection was to the Philippines’ attempts at consolidating its soldiers’ crumbling foothold on the rapidly disintegrating hulk. If so, this could
explain the use of coercion against the Philippine supply missions. Beijing’s public
statements contained no hint of this until 30 May 2013, three weeks after the constant
presence at the shoal began, so it is possible this was simply an ex post facto rhetorical
justification for a coercive policy on which the regime already had decided for other
reasons.294 But equally, the Philippines’ plan to consolidate the outpost may have become
known to the PRC authorities only through the constant surveillance. If so, the threat
to China’s position in this area could help explain the use of coercion against Philippine
supply missions, though not the decision to apply pressure to the Philippine outposts
through the maintenance of a constant presence there.
However, the greatest challenge to the PRC’s local position in the dispute came after the
confrontations in March 2014, when both the Philippines and the United States recognized the outpost for the first time. Manila had insisted since 1999 that the ship had
not been placed on the reef deliberately, and was instead to be treated as a navy ship at
sea, but on 14 March 2014, it referred to it for the first time as a “permanent Philippine
Government installation.” Two days earlier, the United States had affirmed that Philippine efforts to preserve its crumbling position on the reef were maintaining the “status
quo.”295 This surely was the most significant shock to the PRC’s undefined claims over
the atoll, but if it had any effect on Beijing’s conduct it was a moderating one, for the
escalatory trend did not continue.
The confrontations commenced several months after Xi Jinping’s assumption of the top
CCP leadership position, and thus may have resulted from Xi’s own distinct, hawkish
preferences compared with those of his predecessors. The incident also followed soon
after the announcement of the “reorganization” of the State Oceanic Administration,
creating the CCG—an organizational restructuring that prompted significant resistance
at the substate level.296 Thus, it is possible that the mission was given to the units partly
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to force the merger forward—a bureaucratic logic that also may help to explain the
HYSY 981 rig mission (see case study 9).
There is, however, solid evidence against substate agencies having acted contrary to the
center’s intentions in this case. Not only did the foreign ministry promptly affirm the
CCG’s actions in press conferences, but those actions were protracted, giving the center
ample opportunity to intervene. This extended duration also indicates that the move
was not a strategic probe aimed at testing the response of the Philippines and the United
States; it continued across eighteen months or more, despite significant Philippine
resistance. With the passing of the Eighteenth CCP Congress and the transition to Xi
Jinping’s leadership, elite contention likely was lower in 2013–14 than in the preceding
year, so this is unlikely to explain the timing of the change in China’s policy over Second
Thomas Shoal. And while the area has been referred to as the “gateway” to Reed Bank,
this appellation is rather tenuous, for several other occupied features lie closer to that
resource-rich area. Although scattered reports have suggested that Chinese fishermen
may have entered the Second Thomas Shoal lagoon and cut coral there, such activities
do not appear to have been carried out on any large scale. Therefore neither fisheries nor
energy resources are likely to have been a primary motivation for the move.
Conclusion. The PRC’s actions at Second Thomas Shoal—first, in establishing a constant
coast guard presence there, and second, in harassing Philippine ships carrying supplies
to repair the Philippines’ crumbling outpost and replenish its marooned personnel—are
fully understandable without introducing nationalist public opinion into the picture.
Newly arrived maritime constabulary capabilities probably made the enterprise possible,
and in the Philippines’ request for an arbitration under UNCLOS and the country’s plans
to consolidate its outpost at Second Thomas Shoal the PRC perceived serious challenges
to its position locally and in the South China Sea more generally. Once we consider the
way the issue was presented in the domestic media throughout most of the duration of
the standoff—downplaying the assertiveness of China’s new policy—as well as the close
correlation between central information releases and surges in public attention toward
the issue, the alternative explanations are sufficient. Most likely, China’s publicity of its
activities was aimed at banking a popular nationalist legitimacy windfall for a policy
choice already made.
Case Study 9. The HYSY 981 Incident, 2014:
Keeping Nationalism on the Sidelines
On May 2, 2014, China positioned a massive oil-drilling platform, HYSY 981, in disputed waters 120 nm from the Vietnamese coast and 17 nm south of Triton Island. The
location was similar to, if slightly less provocative than, that of the 2007 rig incident
examined in case study 1.297
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In response, the Vietnamese government sent law-enforcement ships and maritime
militia to attempt to disrupt the drilling. Anticipating some Vietnamese response, China
organized a multiregional, cross-departmental fleet of government patrol boats from
both national and provincial coast guard and fisheries forces to guard and escort the
rig. Several weeks of dramatic on-water clashes ensued, including numerous rammings
by both sides’ vessels, water cannon battles, and the sinking of one Vietnamese fishing
boat.298 Vietnam also launched a truculent campaign to oppose the operation in domestic and international media, typified by its dispatch of fishing militia and patrol boats,
accompanied by domestic and foreign journalists, to confront the PRC escort ships.299
China has engaged in drilling operations in certain disputed parts of the South China
Sea periodically, beginning in 1997 at the latest. What made the HYSY 981 case representative of China’s current gray-zone policy, as distinct from the pre-2006 period, was
the deployment of coercion via white-hulled maritime law-enforcement vessels to secure
the operation—a new line of coercive behavior apparent in the 2007 Triton 626 incident.
Once again, as in 2007, the PRC authorities made no attempt to claim the credit for their
bold policy; and after serious, and in many cases violent, anti-China protests flared up
across Vietnam, Beijing successfully used well-coordinated information-control techniques to keep Chinese public opinion on the sidelines.300 The crisis ended two months
later in July, when the PRC withdrew HYSY 981 a month ahead of schedule. This demonstrated the PRC’s ongoing ability to stay in control of popular nationalist sentiments
toward the South China Sea issue in the Internet era.
Official Comments and State Media. In contrast to instances of PRC maritime assertiveness that ostensibly were tough responses to actions by rival claimants, the HYSY 981
incident clearly began as a unilateral Chinese initiative. Therefore, Beijing had excellent
opportunities to use the gray-zone operation to rally domestic support, or draw international attention to domestic nationalist public opinion, or both, if it had chosen to do
so. It did neither, strongly contradicting both the legitimacy and instrumental models of
popular nationalism’s role in foreign policy. Nor was there uneven media coverage that
would suggest that contending elites enlisted public opinion to bring about the policy
through internal debates.
Chinese authorities made no attempt to use this assertive maritime behavior to impress
the domestic mass audience. On the contrary, CCP official comments and propaganda
actively downplayed its significance. On 7 May, as the early on-water clashes raged, an
order from the Central Propaganda Department instructed online media to find and delete any reports on Sino-Vietnamese collisions at sea rigorously.301 Two days later, when
PRC media finally began reporting the issue, coverage was dominated by MFA official
Yi Xianliang’s remark that China was “stunned” to have had its ships rammed 171 times
during “completely normal” operations.302
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As the crisis continued, PRC officials repeatedly emphasized that such operations had
been carried out in the area for more than a decade.303 Far from showing unprecedented
strength and boldness in a controversial disputed area, the official line presented China
simply as the victim of inexplicable acts of madness by its unruly southern neighbor.
This strongly suggests that impressing the public to build domestic nationalist legitimacy
was not among Beijing’s motivations for undertaking the HYSY 981 operation. Nor did
the party-state attempt to channel public opinion toward the issue for international
diplomatic purposes. Indeed, as shown below, spiraling anti-China violence in Vietnam
demonstrated the CCP’s concern with, and ability to avoid, involving Chinese popular
nationalist sentiments in its assertive maritime policy at this time.
Public Attention and Mobilization. As noted, the CCP opted to keep the public on the
sidelines rather than attempting to claim the credit for the HYSY 981 operation. But
the difficulty of doing so intensified greatly when the anti-Chinese riots broke out in
Vietnam. This resulted in the deaths of four Chinese citizens and severe damage to businesses—an event that ordinarily would spark outrage among citizens of any country so
affected. But rather than attempting to harness patriotic power to engage Vietnam in a
battle of “public will” over disputed maritime possessions, as it had done in 2012 with
the Philippines and Japan (case studies 6 and 7), the CCP sought instead to minimize the
risk of instability within its own borders. Available quantitative and qualitative evidence
suggests that this was highly successful. Compared with the Philippines’ attempted detention of fishermen at Scarborough Shoal in 2012, the harm to Chinese citizens during
the HYSY 981 incident was far worse, yet the reaction from the online public in China
appears to have been much smaller. Figure 22 shows that the weekly average BSI for 南
海 (South China Sea), which offers a proxy for public demand for information on the
dispute, peaked at just under 2,000 in mid-May 2014, compared with over 10,000 during
the Scarborough Shoal incident two years earlier.
Using a combination of traditional mass media control, social media censorship, and
calibrated guidance of online media, the PRC prevented news of the dramatic developments in Vietnam from spreading among the wider population for nearly forty-eight
hours.304 Rather than simply ordering online news providers to delete all information on
the topic, propaganda authorities demanded that the issue be kept off the front pages of
major news-portal websites and apps, thereby relegating the story to low-traffic subsections.305 A total information blackout might have prompted outrage or panic among
groups potentially affected, such as residents of border areas, PRC citizens in Vietnam,
and their families. This kind of calibrated censorship allowed vital information to reach
users who already knew about the events while reducing the further spread of information on the issue.
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Figure 22. Baidu search activity for “South China Sea,” 2009–15.

Once the situation in Vietnam had stabilized, the CCP propounded a version of events
that obscured the linkage between the anti-China riots and China’s assertive actions at
sea while forestalling anger among the Chinese population by framing the violence as
“antiforeign” and emphasizing Vietnam’s contrition.306 As a result, Beijing was able to
delay the peak in the Chinese public’s interest in the issue until 16 May—three days after
the deadly anti-Chinese riots across Vietnam (figure 23). Importantly, when it did decide
to comment on the violence in Vietnam, it did so in a restrained manner that decoupled
the events in Vietnam from its own foreign policy choices while emphasizing the corrective measures that Hanoi already was taking. Some Chinese nationalist activists called
for protests against Vietnam, but this appeared to achieve little if any resonance among
the broader public. One demonstration reportedly was permitted by authorities in Kunming, but it attracted only a handful of people.307 In sum, the party-state appears to have
mounted a careful, coordinated campaign to keep popular nationalism on the sidelines
throughout the HYSY 981 episode.
Explanations. Any explanation of why Beijing launched the HYSY 981 operation starts
with the country’s growing specific maritime capabilities. The action was a continuation of the PRC’s “offshore oil exploration strategy,” with comparable actions having
been pursued in disputed areas, albeit with less-advanced equipment, in 1997, 2004, and
2007.308 With the element of a coercive on-water escort, the HYSY 981 episode continued
Figure 23. Baidu search activity for “Vietnam,” April–May 2014. The figure in the box shows the
peak in PRC users’ demand for related information on 16 May.
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the pattern first seen in the Triton 626 incident in 2007: a state-owned oil company conducts drilling, maritime law-enforcement agencies organize cordons around the platform
to prevent interference, and clashes ensue as Beijing attempts to convince its adversary
to acquiesce. Given the unprecedented size of the escort fleet (according to Vietnamese
sources, it consisted of up to forty-two CCG cutters), the UNCLOS-enabled gray-zone
maritime law-enforcement capabilities were evidently necessary to the operation.309
Another key factor was the acquisition of the gargantuan oil rig itself, which had been
launched in 2011. This dramatically increased the maximum depth at which China
could drill for offshore oil, which in turn expanded the exploration area potentially
available to China’s offshore oil companies in untapped disputed areas of the South
China Sea. As for the coercive actions of HYSY 981’s on-water escort, this also continued
the pattern seen previously in the 2007 Triton 626 incident discussed in case study 1—
but once again on an unprecedented scale. This being the case, the growth of the PRC’s
specific maritime administrative and technological capabilities offers a strong rationale
for its actions.
However, capabilities quite possibly are not the whole story. It seems likely that Beijing
failed to anticipate the diplomatic costs of the project and Vietnam’s fierce reaction. If so,
the decision to proceed could be understood as a result of substate bargaining processes.310 PRC state-owned oil companies often have been eager to explore in disputed areas,
but the party-state routinely has ignored these lobbying attempts.311 But according to
International Crisis Group sources, the decision to approve the HYSY 981 operation
was made by the Maritime Rights Leading Small Group (LSG). While Xi Jinping himself
headed the LSG at its establishment in 2012, these sources suggest that the body lacked
specialized knowledge of Southeast Asia that would have flagged the likely consequences.312 If this was so, the decision to go ahead with the provocative operation was also
partly the outcome of substate PRC bureaucratic politics.
A related possibility is that the operation also may have been intended partly to foster
cooperation among the competing maritime law-enforcement agencies within the CCG,
which reportedly remained antagonistic after the CCG’s formation in 2013.313 Finally, the
timing also may have been related to the events in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, which
greatly reduced the (already somewhat remote) prospect of Vietnam receiving assistance
from its main security ally, Russia.
Conclusion. There was no role for Chinese popular nationalism, as either a cause of
assertive policy or an instrument of coercive diplomacy, in the 2014 HYSY 981 episode.
Chinese citizens were not informed about the party-state’s bold move until Vietnam’s
on-water opposition prompted fierce on-water clashes. When Beijing did inform its
audiences, it actively refuted any notion that it had acted assertively, instead presenting
itself as exercising patient forbearance in the face of irrational Vietnamese opposition.

76

china maritime studies

Once the crisis escalated, even with terrible violence against Chinese citizens, Beijing
demonstrated that, with a range of careful information-management techniques, including subtle censorship of online media to keep the issue out of the headlines without
imposing a dangerous information blackout, it could keep popular nationalism on the
sidelines of its maritime policy in the Internet era.
China’s increased maritime administrative and technological capabilities, together
with the development of its gray-zone maritime law-enforcement capabilities, offer a
compelling explanation for Beijing’s actions. Substate actors may have pushed the project
for months or years, but this time the party-state appears to have failed to understand
the consequences of its decision, owing to a lack of expertise on the relevant decisionmaking bodies.

Conclusion: Policy Implications
The case studies examined above suggest that the intensification of China’s gray-zone
maritime operations has had much less to do with popular nationalism than commonly
is assumed. In several important cases, including the early intensifications of white-hull
activities in 2006–2007, the 2009 Impeccable incident, and the 2014 Sino-Vietnamese oil
rig confrontations, bottom-up influence can be disconfirmed quite strongly, as the state
made no effort to publicize its assertive actions or claim patriotic plaudits for them.
The most plausible cases of popular nationalist influence involve (1) the enlistment of
media and public opinion in an effort to secure greater operational authority, or resources for maritime law enforcement, or both, in the Sino-Indonesian clashes; (2) the possible cumulative effect of several months of policy moderation, combined with elevated
elite tensions, ahead of the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff; and (3) a feedback loop
from Beijing’s unsuccessful attempt to deter Tokyo’s Diaoyu Islands purchase by drawing public attention toward the dispute in August 2012. Even these potential cases lack
clinching evidence; the latter two cases arguably are explicable without any reference to
popular influence. In several cases we have seen signs that state-guided outpourings of
popular patriotic sentiment have helped the state project deterrence signals in support of
its gray-zone policy guideline of simultaneous “rights defense and stability maintenance.”
However, it is worth reiterating the limited scope of the analysis presented here, which
focuses only on cases typical of the changes in China’s coercive on-water behavior since
2006. As the Diaoyu Islands cases in particular showed, public opinion may well have
affected other aspects of China’s conduct in these disputes, such as diplomatic behavior,
deployment of economic coercion, and cancelation of cooperative initiatives. Beijing
undoubtedly takes nationalist public opinion on sensitive foreign policy issues seriously;

chinese nationalism and the “gray zone”

77

the finding here is simply that this has not had any significant impact on the conduct of
China’s ships in disputed areas.
Despite the restricted scope of the analysis, some policy implications are apparent. First,
the evidence of sharply limited effects of popular nationalism on even these sensitive issues, together with the decidedly mixed results of Beijing’s apparent attempts at strategic
communication via public opinion, suggests a need for deeper dialogue between Chinese government personnel and their foreign counterparts on the foreign policy roles of
public opinion. Chinese officials frequently claim to be constrained or pressured by their
nationalist citizenry, but such claims often are either dismissed reflexively or silently accepted as plausible rather than followed up and discussed in greater depth.
Such occasions are opportunities for China and its interlocutors to understand better
each other’s political circumstances and beliefs about politics. Why exactly would an
MFA diplomat worry about nationalism? Have such officials been attacked or stymied
in the past by rival elites aligning themselves with the supposed vox populi, or do they
actually fear the possibility of nationalist-proletarian insurrection? Would a diversionary
conflict work to China’s advantage during a domestic crisis? What sorts of messages, if
any, should foreign observers take away when China allows popular nationalist indignation to flow toward foreign countries? When have these signals been misinterpreted, or
missed altogether, in the past, and with what consequence? With many Western states
now grappling with rises in antiforeign sentiments fueled by rapidly developing information technology, it is an opportune time for PRC officials and their counterparts to
discuss these complex but vital questions.
Second, not surprisingly, popular nationalist influence appears most likely to arise where
human citizens are involved. Three of the four most plausible cases of a bottom-up nationalist factor involved the detention of fishermen in PRC-claimed areas. This implies
that leaders should make special efforts to handle incidents involving personnel swiftly
and diplomatically—away from the eyes of the public—even if the stakes may appear
low. At the same time, however, the HYSY 981 case reaffirmed that the party continues
to possess the capability to shape the prevalence of such issues in public discourse, even
where violence has occurred against Chinese citizens. Once again, foreign interlocutors
of China should seek to open frank discussions about these capabilities with their PRC
counterparts, both to signal their awareness of them and potentially to open up possibilities for improved communication during future contentious foreign policy events.
The third, more general, policy implication flows from this volume’s findings on what
does drive China’s maritime policy. Some of the assertive maritime behavior examined above likely was motivated by growing incentives to access the disputed area’s
resources—a motivation that could recede somewhat as the share of hydrocarbons in
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China’s (and the world’s) energy mix decreases. Other assertive actions at sea appear to
have been responses to new challenges to the viability of China’s prospects of realizing
particular claims. At least one—the Impeccable incident—may have been a strategic
probe. But, above all, these cases suggest how China’s specific maritime administrative
capabilities, many of which were developed in response to the country’s accession to the
UNCLOS regime in the 1990s, lie behind much of the recent intensification of the PRC’s
assertive maritime activities.
This bears directly on both the general policy issue of deterrence in slow-burning
maritime disputes and the specific question whether other states can have a meaningful
influence on China’s conduct. If China’s on-water activities generally have been a result
of calculated policy rather than irrational behavior driven by domestic nationalist impulses, this implies that external actors potentially can shape China’s actions using rational incentives and disincentives. But at the same time, the finding that much of China’s
recent assertiveness likely was set in motion by long-term processes and decisions made
many years earlier suggests the country may be following a kind of path-dependent logic
largely immune to carrots and sticks. Foreign policy makers considering how to respond
to assertive PRC behavior at sea need to take into account these contradictory logics.
One way to do so is to distinguish different types of maritime activities, on the basis of
how they relate to particular policy goals or normative standards. For parties with an
interest in peace and stability, the simplest distinction may be the most useful: coercive
versus noncoercive actions. Because they involve the threat or use of punishment, coercive actions naturally are more apt to result in escalation—but they also may be easier to
deter. Among the cases examined above, the coercive actions generally appear to have
been ad hoc initiatives or responses (e.g., Impeccable or Scarborough Shoal), rather than
the result of slow-moving, institutionalized policies involving heavy, long-term investments (e.g., regular patrols, offshore energy explorations, or island construction). This
suggests that, although some assertive PRC maritime activities likely will grind onward
as long as the country’s relative power continues to increase, current officials probably
have greater discretion over ad hoc coercive operations. Where foreign policy makers
find long-planned, costly, but noncoercive aspects of China’s policy (e.g., island building or intensifying routine patrol presence) objectionable, rather than attempting to
deter them entirely, a more realistic goal may be to seek moderation in the intensity or
frequency of the action in question and to mitigate its strategic implications.
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